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FRAUD AGAINST FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS:
JUDGING MATERIALITY POST-ESCOBAR
MATTHEW A. EDWARDS*
ABSTRACT
In Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999), the Supreme
Court held that proof of materiality is required for convictions under
the federal mail, wire and bank fraud statutes. During the past 20
years, the federal courts have endeavored to apply the complex common law concept of materiality to the federal criminal law context.
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Universal Health Services,
Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016), a civil
case involving the False Claims Act, provided the federal appellate
courts with an ideal opportunity to reconsider materiality standards
in federal fraud cases. In particular, criminal fraud defendants
have argued that Escobar’s “subjective” materiality standard should
be applied in mail, wire and bank fraud cases involving financial
institutions. Thus far, these arguments have failed. Instead, the
Courts of Appeals have endorsed an objective materiality standard
tethered to what a reasonable bank would do—not the behavior
of renegade lenders. This Article explores judicial treatment of
materiality in federal criminal fraud cases, and investigates the
many challenges that criminal fraud defendants face when they
try to undermine the government’s proof of materiality by attacking
the imprudent or reckless actions of banks and other lenders.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2016, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit issued a rather curious decision regarding a mortgage fraud
scheme engineered by a mortgage loan officer and real estate broker
named Nicholas Lindsey.1 In a criminal prosecution under the
federal wire fraud statute, the Ninth Circuit explicitly held “as a
matter of law, that when a lender requests specific information in
its loan applications, false responses to those specific requests are
objectively material for purposes of proving fraud.”2 This holding
was deeply problematic. The very fact that a lender requests information cannot simply render that information material as a
matter of law. Such an approach eviscerates the very notion of
materiality and, furthermore, deprives the jury of its essential fact
finder’s role in criminal trials.3
Fortunately, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Universal
Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar,4 came to the
rescue. Although Escobar is a civil case involving the False Claims
Act, the Supreme Court’s extensive discussion of materiality in
Escobar provided the Ninth Circuit with a justification for reconsidering Lindsey I.5 Eventually, the panel opinion in Lindsey
I was withdrawn,6 and was replaced by an opinion containing
more extensive and thoughtful analysis about materiality in federal
United States v. Lindsey (Lindsey I), 827 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 2016), reh’g
granted, opinion withdrawn, United States v. Lindsey, 854 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir.
2017), on reh’g, United States v. Lindsey (Lindsey II), 850 F.3d 1009 (2017).
2 Lindsey I, 827 F.3d at 871.
3 See Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 219 (2006) (stating that “materiality is an element of the mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud statutes,
and thus must be submitted to the jury to support conviction of those crimes”
(citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 20 (1999))); Youngjae Lee, Reasonable
Doubt and Moral Elements, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 3 (2015) (“The
law is axiomatic. In order to convict a defendant, the Constitution requires a
jury to determine that he is ‘guilty of every element of the crime with which he is
charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466, 477 (2000) (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995)))).
4 Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct.
1989 (2016). This Article will refer to this Supreme Court case as Escobar;
some sources use Universal Health Services instead.
5 See infra notes 103–11 and accompanying text (discussing Escobar’s
treatment of materiality).
6 See United States v. Lindsey, 854 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2017) (granting petition for rehearing and withdrawing prior opinion).
1
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fraud prosecutions.7 What remained the same in Lindsey II, however, was the presence of deep judicial skepticism towards defendants who challenge the government’s proof of materiality in mail,
wire and bank fraud cases by attacking the behavior of lenders.8
Put bluntly, the Ninth Circuit did not want federal fraud trials
to become a forum for adjudicating the incompetence or malfeasance of mortgage lenders who may have helped to trigger the Great
Recession.9 An observation that survived from Lindsey I to Lindsey
II is particularly telling:
We understand the desire to see lenders shoulder responsibility
for their role in the mortgage crisis of the last decade .... However,
that does not mean that lenders can be victimized by intentional
fraudulent conduct with impunity merely because the lenders
were negligent, or even because the lenders intentionally disregarded the information in a loan application. Two wrongs do
not make a right, and lenders’ negligence, or even intentional
disregard, cannot excuse another’s criminal fraud.10

This Article examines materiality standards in fraud cases
involving financial institutions and, in particular, considers whether
Escobar signals a change in the treatment of materiality for criminal cases brought under the federal mail, wire and bank fraud
statutes. The Article proceeds as follows: Part I briefly surveys the
three primary anti-fraud laws that are used to fight schemes directed at financial institutions: the federal mail, wire and bank
fraud statutes.11 In particular, Part I examines the meaning of
the materiality requirement established over 20 years ago by the
7 Judge Graber replaced Judge Noonan on the Lindsey II panel. See Lindsey
II, 850 F.3d at 1011 n.*. A separate memorandum opinion vacated Lindsey’s sentence and the amount of restitution ordered for reasons unrelated to the topic of
this Article. See United States v. Lindsey, 680 F. App’x 563, 567–68 (9th Cir. 2017).
8 See Lindsey II, 850 F.3d at 1011–13.
9 See id. A discussion of the meaning of mortgage fraud and its role in
causing the Great Recession can be found in Matthew A. Edwards, The Concept
and Federal Crime of Mortgage Fraud, 57 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 57 (2020).
10 Lindsey II, 850 F.3d at 1014 (footnote omitted). The same language appears
in Lindsey I, 827 F.3d, 865, 869–70 (9th Cir. 2016). The Ninth Circuit explains it
used “the words ‘victimized’ and ‘victim’ in this context to describe the original
lenders, while acknowledging that the entities that actually lost money in this
scheme at the time of foreclosure—the victims in this case for the purposes of
restitution—were those financial institutions that purchased the loans and/or
collateral from the original lenders.” Lindsey II, 850 F.3d at 1014 n.3.
11 See infra Part I.
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Supreme Court in Neder v. United States.12 Part II summarizes key
aspects of the Supreme Court’s decision in Escobar with respect to
materiality under the False Claims Act.13 As we will see, criminal
defendants have argued that Escobar’s subjective materiality standard should be applied to wire, mail and bank fraud cases involving
financial institutions.14 These fraud defendants have argued that
they should be permitted, under Escobar, to introduce evidence
about the actual decision-making processes of banks to challenge
the materiality of their misstatements to financial institutions.15
Part III of the Article uses Lindsey II and another recent federal
circuit court decision, United States v. Raza,16 to illustrate judicial
treatment of materiality in federal criminal fraud cases in light
of Escobar.17 In both cases, the courts rejected the defendants’ efforts to graft Escobar’s subjective materiality standard on to mail,
wire and bank fraud cases.18 Instead, both circuits endorsed an
objective conception of materiality, which focuses on how a reasonable lender—not a renegade bank—might respond to a defendant’s misrepresentations.19
Despite general agreement as to objective materiality
standards post-Escobar, Part IV of the Article analyzes how the
federal appellate courts have diverged in terms of their treatment
of materiality evidence in criminal fraud cases.20 To be specific,
the Ninth Circuit in Lindsey II adopted bright-line prophylactic
rules against the introduction of materiality evidence of individual
lender behavior in financial fraud cases, while the Fourth Circuit
in Raza declined to do so.21 Finally, Part V of the Article dispels any
lingering confusion over whether objective or subjective materiality standards apply in federal criminal fraud cases involving
financial institutions.22 The upshot is that the endorsement of
527 U.S. 1, 1 (1999).
See infra Part II.
14 See infra notes 109–10 and accompanying text.
15 See infra text accompanying notes 95–96.
16 876 F.3d 604 (4th Cir. 2017).
17 See infra Part III.
18 See infra notes 167–85 and accompanying text (discussing Lindsey II);
infra notes 250–60 and accompanying text (discussing Raza).
19 See infra Section III.E (summarizing the key lessons of Lindsey II and Raza).
20 See infra Part IV.
21 See infra Section IV.A.
22 See infra Part V.
12
13
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objective materiality in the federal appellate courts post-Escobar
does not necessarily mean that the government is precluded from
establishing materiality with subjective materiality evidence. On
the other hand, defendants who seek to attack financial institutions for their foolish or imprudent lending practices will find
that they face hostile legal terrain, which limits the viability of
such arguments.
I.FRAUD AGAINST FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: A PRIMER
A. The Wire, Mail and Bank Fraud Statutes
Frauds against financial institutions can be prosecuted
under a variety of federal laws, including, most importantly, the
federal wire, mail and bank fraud statutes.23 The wire and mail
fraud statutes,24 with their long histories and extraordinary flexibility,25 are widely touted as “the workhorses of federal whitecollar prosecution.”26 Although they may be beloved by federal
See Steven M. Biskupic, Fine Tuning the Bank Fraud Statute: A Prosecutor’s Perspective, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 381, 381 (1999) (stating that the bank fraud
statute’s “broadness and flexibility have made it the lead charge for prosecutors
indicting hundreds of white-collar crimes that affect financial institutions
each year”); Thomas M. DiBiagio, Reaching a Sense of Justice: Understanding
How the Facilitation Theory of Prosecution Under Federal Criminal Law Can
Be Used to Hold Hard Targets Accountable for Financial Crimes and Corporate
Corruption, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 256, 266 (2018) (asserting that “[t]he
primary federal criminal laws used to address financial crimes and corporate
misconduct are the federal mail and wire fraud statutes”).
24 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (wire fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (mail fraud); 18 U.S.C.
§ 1344 (bank fraud).
25 The federal mail fraud statute was first enacted in 1872. See Act of June 8,
1872, ch. 335, § 302, 17 Stat. 323 (1872). The wire fraud statute followed in
1952. See Act of July 16, 1952, ch. 879, § 18(a), 66 Stat. 722 (1952).
26 Frank O. Bowman, III, Pour Encourager Les Autres? The Curious History
and Distressing Implications of the Criminal Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act and the Sentencing Guidelines Amendments That Followed, 1 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 373, 384 (2004). Numerous sources use the exact term “workhorse” to
describe the mail and wire fraud statutes. See, e.g., Eric Alden, Blocking the
Ax: Shielding Corporate Counsel from Retaliation As an Alternative to White
Collar Hypercriminalization, 36 U. HAW. L. REV. 95, 108 (2014) (stating that “the
mail and wire fraud provisions are workhorses of the federal prosecutorial bar”)
(citing Jack E. Robinson, The Federal Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes: Correct
Standards for Determining Jurisdiction and Venue, 44 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
23
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prosecutors,27 the seemingly boundless application of these two
statutes has generated scholarly and judicial consternation.28 The
Seventh Circuit recently warned: “The mail and wire fraud statutes have ‘been invoked to impose criminal penalties upon a
staggeringly broad swath of behavior,’ creating uncertainty in
business negotiations and challenges to due process and federalism. We must take care not to stretch the long arms of the fraud
statutes too far.”29
The federal bank fraud statute is of relatively recent vintage in comparison to the mail and wire fraud statutes.30 Congress
enacted the federal bank fraud statute in 1984,31 in response to
various concerns about the sufficiency of then-existing federal
anti-fraud laws,32 and to counter Supreme Court case law that
479, 479 (2008)); Geraldine Szott Moohr, Playing with the Rules: An Effort to
Strengthen the Mens Rea Standards of Federal Criminal Laws, 7 J.L. ECON.
& POL’Y 685, 694 (2011); Julie Rose O’Sullivan, The Federal Criminal “Code”:
Return of Overfederalization, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 57, 63 (2014).
27 Perhaps the most famous quote on this matter comes from District
Judge Jed Rakoff (S.D.N.Y.), then a federal prosecutor, who wrote 40 years
ago: “To federal prosecutors of white collar crime, the mail fraud statute is
our Stradivarius, our Colt 45, our Louisville Slugger, our Cuisinart—and our
true love.” Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DUQ. L.
REV. 771, 771 (1980).
28 See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41930, MAIL AND WIRE FRAUD: A
BRIEF OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW 1 (2019) (“Commentators have argued
that the statutes ‘have long provided prosecutors with a means by which to
salvage a modest, but dubious, victory from investigations that essentially
proved unfruitful.’” (citing John C. Coffee, Jr. & Charles K. Whitehead, The
Federalization of Fraud: Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes, in WHITE COLLAR
CRIME: BUSINESS AND REGULATORY OFFENSES § 9.05, at 9-73 (1990))).
29 United States v. Weimert, 819 F.3d 351, 356 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting
Sorich v. United States, 555 U.S. 1204 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari)).
30 For the history of the federal bank fraud statute, see Biskupic, supra note
23, at 382–83; Mehul Madia, The Bank Fraud Act: A Risk of Loss Requirement?,
72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1445, 1446–49 (2005); 1 JOHN K. VILLA, BANKING CRIMES:
FRAUD, MONEY LAUNDERING AND EMBEZZLEMENT § 7:1 (Nov. 2019 Update)
(providing legislative history of the bank fraud statute).
31 See Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1108(a), 98 Stat. 2147 (Oct. 12, 1984) (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 1344).
32 See Michael McGregor, Bank Fraud, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WHITE-COLLAR
& CORPORATE CRIME 73–74 (2005) (Lawrence M. Salinger, ed.) (“The enactment
of Section 1344 of the law was the product of growing concern over the inability
of federal prosecutors to reach sophisticated financial criminals with antiquated
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members of Congress believed impeded prosecutions of frauds involving financial institutions.33 Since 1984, the bank fraud statute
has been applied to myriad forms of financial malfeasance involving financial institutions, as one article explains:
Section 1344 is broadly written and criminalizes a variety of
offenses against financial institutions, including check-kiting,
check forging, false statements and nondisclosures on loan applications, stolen checks, the unauthorized use of automated
teller machines (“ATMs”), credit card fraud, student loan fraud,
sham transactions between offshore “shell” banks and domestic
banks, automobile title fraud, diversion of funds by bank employees, submission of fraudulent credit card receipts, false statements intended to induce cashing checks, and mortgage fraud.34

During the past three decades, the statutory penalties for
bank fraud have increased substantially, and Congress has
statutes, many of which were enacted more than 50 years ago.”); VILLA, supra
note 30, § 7:1 (noting “the long-standing complaint of federal prosecutors that
they were forced to stretch outmoded statutes to combat sophisticated fraudulent schemes” and stating that “[t]he enactment of the first federal bank fraud
statute ... was the product of a growing concern over the inability of federal
prosecutors to reach sophisticated financial crime with antiquated statutes”).
33 Numerous sources credit Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279 (1982),
as one of the main inspirations for the bank fraud statute. See, e.g., Madia,
supra note 30, at 1446–47 (explaining that “Congress passed the bank fraud
statute partly in response to the Supreme Court’s 1982 decision in Williams,”
in which “the Supreme Court held that persons who engage in fraudulent
schemes, such as check-kiting, could not be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1014, the
federal provision that criminalized false statements to financial institutions”)
(footnotes omitted). Another line of Supreme Court cases had limited the reach of
the federal mail fraud statute to the dismay of some observers. See Loughrin v.
United States, 573 U.S. 351, 360 (2014) (stating that United States v. Maze,
414 U.S. 395 (1974), was “[o]ne of the decisions prompting enactment of the
bank fraud law”); VILLA, supra note 30, § 7.1 (explaining that the Maze Court
had “held that the mail fraud statute must be construed to apply only where
the mails are used for the purpose of executing the scheme or artifice to defraud, and is not applicable to every case where the mails are utilized at some
point in the scheme”); S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 379 (1983) (“Recent
Supreme Court decisions have underscored the fact that serious gaps now
exist in Federal jurisdiction over frauds against banks and other credit institutions which are organized or operating under Federal law or whose deposits
are federally insured.”).
34 Troy Nichols, Financial Institutions Fraud, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 931,
933–35 (2019) (citations and footnotes omitted).
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amended both the mail and wire fraud statutes to provide for
increased criminal penalties in wire and mail fraud cases involving
financial institutions.35 As it stands now, in addition to substantial civil penalties,36 all three anti-fraud statutes carry a maximum
criminal penalty of $1 million in fines and 30 years imprisonment
in cases involving financial institutions.37 These three anti-fraud
laws thus give prosecutors a powerful set of tools to attack fraud
involving banks and other financial institutions.38
B. Materiality, Reliance and Damages
The federal bank fraud statute was modeled on the mail and
wire fraud statutes,39 and the Supreme Court reads the mail and
See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act, Pub.
L. No. 101-73, § 961(k) (1989) (increasing maximum penalties under § 1344
from $10,000 in fines and five years’ imprisonment to $1 million in fines and
20 years in prison); Id. § 961(i)–(j) (increasing penalties for mail and wire fraud
offenses that affect a financial institution); 1990 Crime Control Act, Pub. L.
No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4861, § 2504(h)–(j) (1990) (increasing the maximum period
of imprisonment for bank fraud violations, as well as cases of mail and wire
fraud affecting a financial institution, to 30 years).
36 See 12 U.S.C. § 1833a. In the interests of space, this Article will not specifically address civil penalties for financial fraud involving financial institutions.
37 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1344.
38 See 18 U.S.C. § 20 (defining “financial institution”). In addition to federally
insured banks and credit unions, foreign bank branches, and holding companies,
mortgage lending businesses were added to the statute after the 2007–2008
financial crisis as part of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act (“FERA”).
See Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 2(a), 123 Stat. 1617 (May 20, 2009); see also United
States v. Banyan, 933 F.3d 548, 553 (6th Cir. 2019) (declining to apply the
bank fraud statute to an alleged fraud scheme involving a mortgage lending
business that occurred prior to FERA’s amendment of 18 U.S.C. § 20).
39 See Wendy Gerwick Couture, Criminal Securities Fraud and the Lower
Materiality Standard, 41 SEC. REG. L.J. 77, 79 (2013) (explaining that “[t]he
bank fraud statute ... was modeled on the mail and wire fraud statutes”); Madia,
supra note 30, at 1458 (discussing background of the bank fraud statute). A House
Judiciary Committee Report on the proposed Bank Fraud Act acknowledged
that the text of § 1344 paralleled the language of the mail fraud and wire fraud
statutes and that the bank fraud statute was intended to incorporate case law
interpretations of those provisions. See Financial Bribery and Fraud Amendments
Act of 1984, H.R. REP. NO. 98-901, 2, 4 (1984). Nevertheless, the Committee
evidenced mixed feelings about the potential scope of these anti-fraud laws,
stating that it was “concerned by the history of expansive interpretations of
that language by the courts,” given that the scope of wire and mail fraud offenses
35
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wire fraud statutes in pari materia.40 Thus, these three anti-fraud
statutes share important legal commonalities, two of which are
crucial for the discussion here.41 First, in Neder v. United States,
the United States Supreme Court unanimously held that the
federal bank, wire and mail fraud statutes all require proof of
materiality.42 The Second Circuit recently explained: “The wire
and bank fraud statutes do not criminalize every deceitful act,
however trivial .... to sustain a conviction under these statutes, the
Government must prove that the defendant in question engaged
in a deceptive course of conduct by making material misrepresentations.”43 Second, unlike fraud in tort law,44 the mail, wire and
bank fraud statutes do not require proof of justifiable reliance or
damages. In Neder, the Supreme Court stated: “The common-law
was “clearly greater than that intended by Congress.” Id. Despite this show of
concern, the House Judiciary Committee explicitly endorsed then-current interpretations of the language, with the final caveat that the Committee “does not
anticipate any further expansions.” Id.
40 See Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 355 n.2 (2005); see also
United States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 1238 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Mail and
wire fraud are analytically identical save for the method of execution.”) (footnotes omitted); CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41931, MAIL AND WIRE
FRAUD: A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW 2 (2019) (“The mail
and wire fraud statutes are essentially the same, except for the medium associated with the offense—the mail in the case of mail fraud and wire communication in the case of wire fraud.”).
41 In fact, courts often use precedents from one federal fraud statute to interpret another. See Lindsey II, 850 F.3d at 1016, n.4 (2017) (noting that
“[t]he Supreme Court has used cases on materiality in one context as precedent for materiality in another”); United States v. Saks, 964 F.2d 1514, 1520
(5th Cir. 1992) (“It is well settled that Congress modeled § 1344 on the mail
and wire fraud statutes, and that the usual practice is to look to precedents
under those statutes to determine its scope and proper interpretation.”);
United States v. Williams, 865 F.3d 1302, 1310 n.10 (10th Cir. 2017) (“The
bank fraud materiality analysis is identical to the materiality analysis required
for convictions of making a false statement under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, mail fraud
under 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341.”).
42 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 25 (1999).
43 United States v. Calderon, 944 F.3d 72, 85 (2d Cir. 2019).
44 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (AM. L. INST. 1977) (“One
who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention or law
for the purpose of inducing another to act or refrain from action in reliance
upon it, is subject to liability to the other in deceit for pecuniary loss caused
to him by his justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation.”).
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requirements of ‘justifiable reliance’ and ‘damages,’ ... plainly have
no place in the federal fraud statutes .... By prohibiting the ‘scheme
to defraud,’ rather than the completed fraud, the elements of reliance and damage would clearly be inconsistent with the statutes
Congress enacted.”45 By definition, then, criminal fraud offenses
are “inchoate” crimes, as Sam Buell explains: “A criminal fraud
case, of course, requires no proof of reliance or damages: the crime
of fraud would be inchoate even if there were not also readily
available attempt and conspiracy doctrines in federal and state
criminal law.”46
The Supreme Court steadfastly has adhered to the principle
that proof of actual harm is not required in federal criminal fraud
cases involving financial institutions.47 For example, in Shaw v.
United States, a recent § 1344(1) bank fraud case,48 the Court stated
45 Neder, 527 U.S. at 24–25. In stark contrast, Neder stated that “the common
law could not have conceived of ‘fraud’ without proof of materiality.” Id. at 22.
46 See Samuel W. Buell, Fraud, in THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF APPLIED
ETHICS AND CRIMINAL LAW 265, 267 (Larry Alexander & Kimberly K. Ferzan
eds. 2019).
47 Shaw v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 462, 467 (2016).
48 To understand this discussion, a little background on the bank fraud
statute is helpful. The bank fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1344, has two separate
subsections. Section 1344(1) covers frauds squarely aimed at financial institutions. See Loughrin v. United States, 573 U.S. 351, 357 (2014) (“The first
clause of § 1344 ... includes the requirement that a defendant intend to ‘defraud
a financial institution’; indeed, that is § 1344(1)’s whole sum and substance.”).
Section 1344(2), on the other hand, makes it a crime to fraudulently obtain not
only a financial institution’s own funds but also those assets under its custody
or control. For many years, the relationship between the two clauses of § 1344
was the subject of judicial debate and uncertainty. See United States v. Nkansah,
699 F.3d 743, 762 (2d Cir. 2012) (Lynch, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment in part) (“Although § 1344 has produced much litigation in the
Circuits and many separate opinions by learned appellate judges, federal courts
do not agree on the mental state necessary to support a conviction under § 1344,
nor on the relationship between the statute’s two subsections.”) (collecting
cases). Eventually, the Supreme Court weighed in on the relationship between
the two subsections of § 1344 and explained that the two subsections of § 1344
“overlap substantially but not completely.” Shaw, 137 S. Ct. at 468. Thus, under
current Supreme Court doctrine, many fraud schemes are amenable to prosecution under either subsection of § 1344. See VILLA, supra note 30, § 7:7 (explaining
that “[i]n many instances, a fraudulent scheme will constitute a violation of
both Subsections (1) and (2)”).
The Supreme Court specifically declined to read the bank fraud statute to
eliminate this partial superfluity, noting: “No doubt, the overlap between the two
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that it had “found no case from this Court interpreting the bank
fraud statute as requiring that the victim bank ultimately suffer
financial harm, or that the defendant intend that the victim bank
suffer such harm.”49 The Shaw Court concluded: “the statute, while
insisting upon ‘a scheme to defraud,’ demands neither a showing
of ultimate financial loss nor a showing of intent to cause financial
loss.”50 Numerous federal circuit court opinions have reiterated
the principle in criminal fraud cases that “there is no requirement that the misrepresentations must have actually influenced
the decision-maker or that the decision-maker in fact relied on
the misrepresentations,”51 though some courts have held that a financial institution must, at least, be exposed to a risk of loss for a
scheme to count as fraudulent.52 Accordingly, criminal fraud can
clauses is substantial on our reading, but that is not uncommon in criminal
statutes.” Loughrin, 573 U.S. at 358 n.4. The superfluity conceded by the
Supreme Court is not complete because there may be some fraud schemes that
can be prosecuted only under § 1344(1), and not § 1344(2). See Loughrin, 573 U.S.
at 353 (“The Courts of Appeals ... have unanimously agreed that the Government can prosecute check kiting (i.e., writing checks against an account with
insufficient funds in a way designed to keep them from bouncing) only under
Clause (1), because such schemes do not involve any false representations.”).
49 Shaw, 137 S. Ct. at 467; see also Loughrin, 573 U.S. at 364 (explaining that
“failure is irrelevant in a bank fraud case, because § 1344 punishes not ‘completed
frauds,’ but instead fraudulent ‘scheme[s]’” (quoting Neder, 527 U.S. at 25)).
50 Shaw, 137 S. Ct. at 467.
51 United States v. O’Brien, 953 F.3d 449, 460 (7th Cir. 2020); see also
United States v. Prieto, 812 F.3d 6, 13 (1st Cir. 2016) (stating that the government “‘need not prove that the decisionmaker actually relied on the falsehood or that the falsehood led to actual damages’” (quoting United States v.
Appolon, 715 F.3d 362, 368 (1st Cir. 2013))); Lindsey II, 850 F.3d 1009, 1014
(2017) (explaining that the government need not prove actual reliance); United
States v. Pizano, 421 F.3d 707, 722 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Under the bank fraud
statute, the Government need not prove that the financial institution actually
relied on the defendant’s misrepresentations.”).
52 In a post-Shaw opinion, the Tenth Circuit stated:
To satisfy the first element of bank fraud under § 1344(1)— “that
the defendant knowingly executed or attempted to execute a
scheme or artifice to defraud a financial institution”—our case law
states that the government must show, in addition to materiality,
that the financial institution was put at “risk,” “potential risk,”
or suffered a “risk of loss.”
United States v. Williams, 865 F.3d 1302, 1310 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting United
States v. Bowling, 619 F.3d 1175, 1181 (10th Cir. 2010)); see also United States
v. Calderon, 944 F.3d 72, 85 (2d Cir. 2019) (stating that “both wire fraud and
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still occur even if a bank discovers a borrower’s misrepresentations
prior to extending credit or ultimately rejects the borrower’s loan
application.53 In fact, one might conceivably argue that the crime
of fraud could still occur even if the bank employees misplace and
fail to review the borrower’s loan application documents altogether.54 What would merely be an unsuccessful attempt at a
civil fraud is a prosecutable criminal fraud.
C. Neder’s Materiality Standards
With one judicial oddity noted below,55 it seems beyond
dispute that Neder and its progeny require proof of materiality
bank fraud require the Government to prove that the defendant had an intent
to deprive the victim of money or property”); United States v. Bogucki, 316 F.
Supp. 3d 1177, 1189 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (“[T]he government need not show that
the bank actually lost money, but rather only that the bank was exposed to a
risk of loss.”) (emphasis in original) (citing United States v. Stargell, 738 F.3d
1018, 1022 (9th Cir. 2013)); United States v. Serpico, 320 F.3d 691, 694 (7th
Cir. 2003). The extent to which the risk of loss requirement survives Shaw is
beyond the scope of my discussion here.
53 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
54 See id.
55 As explained earlier, § 1344 has two separate subsections, see supra note
48, and most circuit courts that have considered the question have held that the
materiality element applies to both prongs of 1344. See United States v. Omer,
395 F.3d 1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[P]ursuant to Neder, materiality of the
scheme is an essential element of bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344(1).
As such, materiality must be alleged in the indictment.”); see also United
States v. Williams, 865 F.3d 1302, 1309 (10th Cir. 2017) (stating, in § 1344(1)
case, that “[t]he misrepresentation or falsehood must be materially false”);
United States v. Gordon, 493 F. App’x 617, 629 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Consistent
with the common law definition of ‘fraud,’ § 1344(1) requires ‘a misrepresentation or concealment of material fact.’” (quoting Neder v. United States, 527
U.S. 1, 22 (1999))); United States v. Del Campo, 695 F. App’x 453, 455–56
(11th Cir. 2017) (in case brought under both sections of § 1344, observing that
“the Supreme Court has held that a conviction for federal bank fraud requires
that the scheme to defraud employ not simply falsehoods, but material falsehoods, even though materiality is not expressly mentioned in the bank-fraud
statute”) (emphasis in original).
Nevertheless, one outlier must be noted. In United States v. LeBeau, 949
F.3d 334, 341 (7th Cir. 2020), the defendant was convicted, after a jury trial,
of multiple counts of bank fraud under § 1344(1). On appeal, LeBeau argued
that the omission of materiality from the instruction in his trial “impermissibly relieved the government of part of its evidentiary burden and prejudiced
him.” Id. at 341. Chief Judge Wood, writing for the Seventh Circuit, conceded
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in federal wire, mail and bank fraud cases and that materiality is a
question for the jury to consider.56 The question is, of course, what
does Neder’s materiality requirement entail? The answer to this
question is not as simple as it first appears. This section will briefly
review what Neder itself states with respect to materiality, as well
as several issues that Neder’s treatment of materiality raises.
1. What Neder Actually Says About Materiality
To understand mail, wire and bank fraud materiality, it is
helpful to start with the text of the Neder opinion itself. The
that the defendant in LeBeau had raised a serious point, in light of Neder’s
holding, Seventh Circuit precedent, and the Committee Comments to the
Seventh Circuit’s Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions. See LeBeau, 949 F.3d at
341; see also United States v. Freed, 921 F.3d 716, 721 (7th Cir. 2019) (“Pattern instructions are presumed to accurately state the law.”) (citing United States
v. Marr, 760 F.3d 733, 744 (7th Cir. 2014)). Chief Judge Wood acknowledged,
however, that there was recent circuit precedent stating that proof of materiality was only required in bank fraud cases brought under § 1344(2), and not
in cases brought under § 1344(1). See LeBeau, 949 F.3d at 341 (citing United
States v. Ajayi, 808 F.3d 1113, 1119 (7th Cir. 2015)). Without stating directly
that the prior panel opinion in Ajayi (on which Chief Judge Wood also sat) was
incorrect, LeBeau provided this guidance:
The better course, consistent with Neder, is to require the materiality instruction on all bank-fraud charges, whether brought
under section 1344(1) or (2). The government has informed us
that this is its current practice, and we encourage that practice
to continue until such time as we receive greater clarity from the
Supreme Court about what is required.
LeBeau, 949 F.3d at 341. See also United States v. Cross, 962 F.3d 892, 901
(7th Cir. 2020) (explaining that “[t]he government assured the panel in LeBeau
that its current practice is to include the materiality element in all section
1344 cases,” which is “a prudent policy”).
Unfortunately for LeBeau, nothing that Chief Judge Wood wrote regarding
materiality in bank fraud jury instructions was of any help to his appeal. The
Court of Appeals held that because LeBeau’s lawyer had explicitly consented to
the instruction without the materiality element, the argument was waived and
could not be reviewed on appeal even for plain error. LeBeau, 949 F.3d at 341–43.
56 See Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 219 (2006) (stating that “materiality is an element of the mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud statutes,
and thus must be submitted to the jury to support conviction of those crimes”)
(citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 20 (1999)); United States v. Rigas,
490 F.3d 208, 231 n.29 (2d Cir. 2007) (explaining that “a criminal defendant
is entitled to have a jury determine his guilt on every element of his alleged
crime and the jury must pass on the materiality of a defendant’s misrepresentations”) (citing United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 522–23 (1995)).
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defendant in Neder was convicted of multiple counts of mail, wire
and bank fraud, and two counts of filing a false income tax return
(also known as tax fraud).57 The specific offenses are important
because Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion in Neder contains
two different formulations of materiality.58 In the portion of the
opinion dealing with tax fraud,59 the Neder Court uses the following definition of materiality: “In general, a false statement is
material if it has a natural tendency to influence, or is capable of
influencing, the decision of the decision-making body to which it was
addressed.”60 It is of interest and importance that the two cases that
Neder quotes in the tax fraud materiality part of the opinion,
United States v. Gaudin,61 and Kungys v. United States,62 both concerned misrepresentations made to United States Government officials.63 Gaudin involved 18 U.S.C. § 1001,64 an extraordinarily
broad statutory provision that covers innumerable false statements to federal government officials.65 Specifically, Gaudin was
prosecuted under § 1001 for making false statements on Federal
Neder, 527 U.S. at 6.
See Wendy Gerwick Couture, White Collar Crime’s Gray Area: The Anomaly
of Criminalizing Conduct Not Civilly Actionable, 72 ALB. L. REV. 1, 8 (2009)
(observing that Neder has two different materiality definitions); United States v.
Raza, 876 F.3d 604, 616 (4th Cir. 2017) (asserting that Neder “identified different standards of materiality for those two categories of fraud”) (citing Neder,
527 U.S. at 16, 22 n.5).
59 Neder, 527 U.S. at 16 (“To obtain a conviction on the tax offense at issue,
the Government must prove that the defendant filed a tax return ‘which he
does not believe to be true and correct as to every material matter.’” (quoting
26 U.S.C. § 7206(1))).
60 To make the Neder language easier to process, I have removed any alterations and internal quotes. Readers should know, however, that Neder, 527 U.S.
at 16, is quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995), which, in turn,
is quoting Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988). This Article will
refer to this as the Gaudin/Kungys materiality definition.
61 515 U.S. 506 (1995).
62 485 U.S. 759 (1988).
63 See United States v. Raza, 876 F.3d 604, 616–17 (4th Cir. 2017) (“The Neder
materiality standard—emphasizing that the false statement must be capable
of influencing the decisionmaking body to which it is addressed—is derived from
earlier decisions assessing materiality issues in fraud schemes that targeted
the federal government.”) (discussing Kungys, 485 U.S. at 769–70).
64 See 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
65 For an overview of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, see Daniel D. Duhaime, False
Statements and False Claims, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 875, 877–92 (2019).
57
58
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Housing Administration and Department of Housing and Urban
Development loan documents.66 At issue in Kungys was a provision
of the Immigration and Nationality Act,67 under which the Government can bring an action to cancel a certificate of naturalization
due to its procurement “by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation.”68 Accordingly, like Gaudin, Kungys also
involved falsehoods aimed at the U.S. government officials—in
the latter case, the Immigration and Naturalization Service.69
The section of the Neder opinion dealing with wire, mail and
bank fraud, however, does not repeat the Gaudin/Kungys materiality formulation,70 but instead quotes the influential materiality
definition from the Restatement (Second) of Torts.71 The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides two alternative definitions
of materiality: (1) a matter is material if “a reasonable man
would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question,”72
or (2) a matter is material if “the maker of the representation
knows or has reason to know that its recipient regards or is likely to regard the matter as important in determining his choice of
action, although a reasonable man would not so regard it.”73 The
comments to the Restatement (Second) of Torts explain the justification for permitting subjective materiality, in addition to objective materiality:
Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 508.
Kungys, 485 U.S. at 763 (stating that the first issue presented in the
case was “whether certain misrepresentations or concealments made by Kungys in
connection with his naturalization proceeding were material within the meaning
of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952”).
68 See 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (setting forth duty of U.S. attorneys to bring actions “for the purpose of revoking and setting aside the order admitting such
person to citizenship and canceling the certificate of naturalization on the ground
that such order and certificate of naturalization were ... procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation”).
69 Kungys, 485 U.S. at 772 (holding that “the test of whether Kungys’ concealments or misrepresentations were material is whether they had a natural
tendency to influence the decisions of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service”).
70 It is entirely possible that the Neder Court felt that repeating the first
materiality standard was not necessary.
71 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 22 n.5. (1999) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 (AM. L. INST. 1977)).
72 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538(2)(a) (AM. L. INST. 1977).
73 Id. § 538(2)(b).
66
67
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Even though the matter misrepresented is one to which a reasonable man would not attach any importance in determining
his course of action in the transaction in hand, it is nevertheless material if the maker knows that the recipient, because
of his own peculiarities, is likely to attach importance to it.
There are many persons whose judgment, even in important
transactions, is likely to be determined by considerations that
the normal man would regard as altogether trivial or even ridiculous. One who practices upon another’s known idiosyncracies
cannot complain if he is held liable when he is successful in what
he is endeavoring to accomplish.74

Thus, the Restatement (Second) of Torts accepts either an
objective standard of materiality, based upon a reasonable person,
or a subjective standard of materiality based upon what the maker
knows about the particular recipient of the misrepresentation;
either suffices. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts similarly
permits either an objective or a subjective standard of materiality
in the context of misrepresentations,75 for reasons that mirror those
provided in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.76
Id. § 538 cmt. f.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“A
misrepresentation is material if it would be likely to induce a reasonable person
to manifest his assent, or if the maker knows that it would be likely to induce
the recipient to do so.”); see also id. § 162 cmt. c (“The requirement of materiality
may be met in either of two ways. First, a misrepresentation is material if it
would be likely to induce a reasonable person to manifest his assent. Second,
it is material if the maker knows that for some special reason it is likely to induce
the particular recipient to manifest his assent.”). This is not to say that materiality necessarily is required to rescind or disaffirm a contract. That is a separate issue.
76 A comment to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, like the comments
to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, explains the justification for permitting
subjective materiality, in addition to objective materiality.
There may be personal considerations that the recipient regards
as important even though they would not be expected to affect
others in his situation, and if the maker is aware of this, the
misrepresentation may be material even though it would not
be expected to induce a reasonable person to make the proposed
contract. One who preys upon another’s known idiosyncrasies
cannot complain if the contract is held voidable when he succeeds
in what he is endeavoring to accomplish.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 1981). See also
Stephanie R. Hoffer, Misrepresentation: The Restatement’s Second Mistake,
2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 115, 129 n.89 (2014) (“The Restatement’s use of the word
74
75
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2. Issues Concerning Neder’s Materiality Standards
As we have seen, Neder requires proof of materiality in fraud
cases brought under the federal, mail, wire and bank fraud statutes.77 According to the Supreme Court: “It is a settled principle
of interpretation that, absent other indication, ‘Congress intends
to incorporate the well-settled meaning of the common-law terms it
uses.”78 But what does materiality really mean? As Emily Sherwin
aptly observes, “[t]he precise meaning of materiality is somewhat
elusive.”79 David Kwok, who concludes that materiality is not a
simple element,80 further contends: “Not only is analysis of materiality itself complex, but the element of materiality is likely
related to existing elements of fraud. Evaluating materiality likely
requires reconsideration of these other factors, and a failure to
understand the interaction may create vagueness and uncertainty.”81 In short, transplanting a slippery, ever-evolving common law term, like materiality, to the criminal law context, as
mandated by Neder, is bound to be a challenging task.
The following related questions regarding the meaning of
materiality recur in this Article.82 First, are the two materiality
‘preys’ is particularly interesting since the maker of a material misrepresentation does not have to know with certainty that the statement is false.”) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1981)).
77 See supra notes 57–76 and accompanying text (discussing Neder).
78 Sekhar v. United States, 570 U.S. 729, 732 (2013).
79 Emily Sherwin, Nonmaterial Misrepresentation: Damages, Rescission,
and the Possibility of Efficient Fraud, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1017, 1020 (2003).
80 David Kwok, Is Vagueness Choking the White-Collar Statute?, 53 GA. L.
REV. 495, 528 (2019).
81 Id. at 532. In particular, proof of mens rea or fraudulent intent is closely
related to the element of materiality. See id. at 532–37 (discussing the relationship in fraud between materiality and mens rea, and between materiality
and harm); United States v. Weaver, 860 F.3d 90, 94 (2d Cir. 2017) (per curiam)
(noting “the connection between the materiality element and the additional
requirement that the government prove fraudulent intent”); United States v.
Svete, 556 F.3d 1157, 1165 (11th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (“Because the focus of
the mail fraud statute, like any criminal statute, is on the violator, the purpose of the element of materiality is to ensure that a defendant actually intended to create a scheme to defraud.”).
82 Exactly how much of an effect (hypothetical or otherwise) is required to
satisfy the criminal fraud materiality standard is a question beyond this Article’s
scope. See United States v. Rigas, 490 F.3d 208, 234 (2d Cir. 2007) (distinguishing
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standards discussed in Neder in tension or are they simply different ways of expressing the same basic legal principle? Second, do
Neder’s two materiality standards apply in different types of fraud
cases?83 (Of course, if the two materiality standards are consonant, then this question would not be of much import). Third, is
the materiality standard in federal criminal fraud cases objective or
subjective?84 Or can materiality be either objective or subjective?85
“relevance” from “materiality”). There are innumerable formulations of materiality in judicial opinions, though, as the Second Circuit opines: “All of these
specifications of the materiality inquiry target the same question: would the
misrepresentation actually matter in a meaningful way to a rational decisionmaker?” United States v. Calderon, 944 F.3d 72, 85 (2d Cir. 2019) (emphasis
in original); see also United States v. Tum, 707 F.3d 68, 72 (1st Cir. 2013) (wire
fraud requires proof of “false or omitted statements that a reasonable person
would consider important in deciding what to do”), cert. denied, 569 U.S. 1025
(2013); United States v. Weaver, 860 F.3d 90, 94 (2d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“A
statement is material if the misinformation or omission would naturally tend
to lead or is capable of leading a reasonable person to change his conduct.”).
83 More specifically, it could be asked whether the Gaudin/Kungys materiality definition applies in mail, wire and bank fraud cases even though that
definition appears in the portion of Neder discussing tax fraud. In Escobar,
Justice Thomas asserts, in passing, that Neder uses the Gaudin/Kungys materiality definition “to interpret the mail, bank, and wire fraud statutes.” Escobar,
136 S. Ct. at 2002 (citing Neder, 527 U.S. at 16). Moreover, since Neder was
decided, many courts have cited the Gaudin/Kungys materiality definition in
federal mail, wire or bank fraud cases. See, e.g., United States v. Prieto, 812
F.3d 6, 13 (1st Cir. 2016); United States v. Appolon, 715 F.3d 362, 368 (1st
Cir. 2013); United States v. Calderon, 944 F.3d 72, 85 (2d Cir. 2019); United
States v. Plany, 711 F. App’x 392, 394 (9th Cir. 2017); United States v. Hames,
185 F. App’x 318, 325 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Rigas, 490 F.3d 208,
231 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Betts-Gaston, 860 F.3d 525, 532 (7th Cir.
2017); see also Couture, supra note 58, at 7–8 (stating that most courts apply
the Gaudin definition in mail and wire fraud cases); William K.S. Wang, Application of the Federal Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes to Criminal Liability For
Stock Market Insider Trading and Tipping, 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 220, 279 n.191
(2015) (collecting cases using the Gaudin/Kungys materiality definition).
84 See generally Lauren D. Lunsford, Fraud, Fools, and Phishing: Mail Fraud
and the Person of Ordinary Prudence in the Internet Age, 99 KY. L. J. 379, 387–94
(2010–2011) (addressing whether an objective or subjective conception of materiality applies in criminal fraud cases). For a discussion of judicial conflicts
over objective and subjective fraud materiality standards pre-Neder, see Mark
Zingale, Note, Fashioning a Victim Standard in Mail and Wire Fraud: Ordinarily
Prudent Person or Monumentally Credulous Gull?, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 795 (1999).
85 See infra Section V.A.

640 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:621
The fourth, and final question is whether Neder’s citation
to the Restatement (Second) of Torts’s definition of materiality
truly counts as an endorsement of this definition by the Supreme Court for use in the criminal fraud context. Not everyone
believes that it does.86 In United States v. Svete,87 Judge Tjoflat
criticized the Eleventh Circuit’s en banc opinion for using modern sources, such as the Restatement (Second) of Torts, to explicate the meaning of materiality under the mail fraud statute.88
In Judge Tjoflat’s view, the Eleventh Circuit ought to have relied
only upon materiality sources that were contemporaneous with
enactment of the mail fraud statute in 1872.89 Moreover, Judge
Tjoflat rejected the idea that Neder commanded such a result,
arguing that the Supreme Court was not endorsing the Restatement (Second) of Torts’s materiality definition in Neder but was
merely “regurgitating” Neder’s arguments.90
See United States v. Svete, 556 F.3d 1157, 1172 (11th Cir. 2009) (en banc)
(Tjoflat, J., specially concurring).
87 Id. In Svete, the Eleventh Circuit held that the mail fraud statute does not
require “proof of a scheme calculated to deceive a person of ordinary prudence.”
Id. at 1166, overruling United States v. Brown, 79 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1996).
88 Id. at 1171–72 (“I am troubled by the court’s reliance on contemporary
sources to define materiality, rather than using the meaning of the word as it
was understood in 1872, the year of the enactment of the mail fraud statute.”)
(Tjoflat, J., specially concurring).
89 Id. at 1172–73. Judge Tjoflat specifically recommends JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (10th ed. 1870), because it “was
written at nearly the same time as the enactment of the mail fraud statute,
that source provides a better understanding of the settled meaning of materiality under the common law as it existed in 1872.” Id. at 1173; see also id. at
1170 (“This case is a statutory construction case involving an old statute. In
defining the acts that the statute declares to be criminal, we must put aside our
modern perceptions and preoccupations. Our job is to determine what Congress
intended at the time the statute was made law.”) (Edmondson, C.J., concurring
in the result).
90 Judge Tjoflat explains:
As I read Neder, the Court only cited the Restatement (Second)
of Torts because Neder, himself, relied on it to support his argument that materiality is an element of the mail fraud statute.
Specifically, the Court cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts in
a footnote appended to the following statement: “Neder contends
that ‘defraud’ is just such a term, and that Congress implicitly
incorporated its common-law meaning, including its requirement
of materiality, into the statutes at issue.” The Court’s citation
86
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Judge Tjoflat, therefore, argues that courts should not use
the Restatement (Second) of Torts “to define the contours of the
mail fraud statute’s materiality requirement.”91 Whether or not
Judge Tjoflat is ultimately correct regarding his reading of Neder,
undoubtedly the Neder Court was more concerned with determining whether the mail, wire and bank fraud statutes required
materiality at all, and the justices likely were less focused on
what the materiality standards ought to entail and whether it
was ideal to apply the Restatement (Second) of Torts to the criminal
context.92 For now it is sufficient to recognize that Neder provides
to the Restatement (Second) of Torts has limited precedential
value because it was merely a regurgitation of Neder’s argument.
Thus, a more straightforward reading of Neder suggests that
the Court did not cite the Restatement (Second) of Torts for the
proposition that the meaning of words in a statute enacted in
1872 can be identified by reference to a modern restatement
of the law.
Svete, 556 F.3d at 1172 (Tjoflat, J., specially concurring) (quoting Neder v.
United States, 527 U.S. 1, 22 (1999) (footnotes omitted)). See also Lunsford,
supra note 84, at 387 (“It is entirely possible that this standard was merely
what Neder was arguing for at the time, rather than the Court’s endorsement
of the ‘reasonable man’ objective standard.”).
91 Id. at 1172–73.
92 A little history is helpful here. Just two years before Neder was decided,
the Supreme Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 1014, which bars false statements to
certain specified financial institutions, did not have a materiality requirement. See United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482 (1997). Given that the wire,
mail and bank fraud statutes, like 18 U.S.C. § 1014, make no explicit mention
of materiality, the big question before the Supreme Court in Neder was
whether the Court would imply a materiality requirement into these federal fraud
statutes at all, not what the materiality standard might entail. Ultimately,
Neder distinguished Wells as follows:
In contrast to Wells, the three federal criminal statutes at issue
in Neder explicitly referred to “schemes or artifices to defraud.”
This textual distinction altered the Court’s analysis. The Neder
Court explained that “both at the time of the mail fraud statute’s original enactment in 1872, and later when Congress
enacted the wire fraud and bank fraud statutes, actionable
‘fraud’ had a well-settled meaning at common law” that “required a misrepresentation or concealment of material fact.”
In fact, the Court noted, “the common law could not have conceived of ‘fraud’ without proof of materiality.”
Matthew A. Edwards, Punishing Hope? Materiality and Immateriality in Federal
Mortgage Fraud Cases under 18 U.S.C. § 1014, 22 U. PENN. J. BUS. L. 492,
499 (2020) (quoting Neder, 527 U.S. at 20–21, 22) (footnotes omitted).
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two materiality standards—the Gaudin/Kungys materiality definition and the Restatement (Second) of Torts’s materiality definition—and that the application of these materiality standards to
criminal fraud cases raises several important questions.93
II.ESCOBAR AND THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
In Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel.
Escobar, the Supreme Court considered the validity of “implied
false certification” claims brought under the False Claims Act
(FCA).94 Justice Thomas explained the nature of such claims:
According to this theory, when a defendant submits a claim, it
impliedly certifies compliance with all conditions of payment.
But if that claim fails to disclose the defendant’s violation of a
material statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement, so the
theory goes, the defendant has made a misrepresentation that
renders the claim “false or fraudulent” under § 3729(a)(1)(A).95

Escobar ultimately held that implied false certification
claims could be a basis of False Claims Act liability when “the
claim does not merely request payment, but also makes specific
representations about the goods or services provided,”96 and “the
defendant’s failure to disclose noncompliance with material statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirements makes those representations misleading half-truths.”97
93 See supra notes 82–86 and accompanying text; text accompanying notes
93–94.
94 Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct.
1989, 1993 (2016); see also Deborah R. Farringer, From Guns that Do Not Shoot to
Foreign Staplers: Has the Supreme Court’s Materiality Standard Under Escobar
Provided Clarity for the Health Care Industry About Fraud Under the False
Claims Act?, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 1227, 1228 (2018) (explaining that the False
Claims Act “permits both private individuals and the federal government
(through the U.S. district attorneys’ offices) to file an action in court on behalf
of the United States against a government contractor believed to have knowingly submitted false claims to the federal government for payment”).
95 Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 1995; 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (providing for civil
liability for one who “knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or
fraudulent claim for payment or approval” to the government).
96 Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2001.
97 Id. Since Escobar was decided there has been some debate as to whether
these two requirements are both absolutely necessary in all implied false certification claims or whether the Supreme Court was merely stating that satisfying
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At the same time, however, the Court also endorsed what
it described as a “demanding” and “rigorous” materiality standard
for implied false certification claims under the FCA.98 A tough
materiality standard was essential because, in the view of the Supreme Court: “The False Claims Act is not ‘an all-purpose antifraud
statute,’ or a vehicle for punishing garden-variety breaches of contract or regulatory violations.”99 Justice Thomas further explained:
A misrepresentation cannot be deemed material merely because
the Government designates compliance with a particular statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement as a condition of
payment. Nor is it sufficient for a finding of materiality that the
Government would have the option to decline to pay if it knew
of the defendant’s noncompliance. Materiality, in addition, cannot be found where noncompliance is minor or insubstantial.100

Justice Thomas declined to specify whether the materiality
standard that applied to implied false certification claims came
from the common law or the text of the FCA itself.101 Instead, he
these two requirements could be one suitable method of proving an implied
false certification claim under the FCA. See United States ex rel. Rose v.
Stephens Inst., 909 F.3d 1012, 1018 (9th Cir. 2018) (observing that the Escobar
“Court did not state that its two conditions were the only way to establish
liability under an implied false certification theory,” but nevertheless explaining
that Ninth Circuit post-Escobar precedent requires proof of both conditions
until a contrary en banc determination occurs); Farringer, supra note 94, at
1250–53 (discussing this issue).
98 Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003 (“The materiality standard is demanding.”);
id. at 1996, 2002 (“rigorous”); see also Stephens Inst., 909 F.3d at 1024 (Smith, J.
dissenting in part) (noting that “[t]he Supreme Court stated four times that
the materiality test was ‘rigorous’ or ‘demanding’”), cert. denied sub nom. Stephens
Inst. v. U.S. ex rel. Rose, 139 S. Ct. 1464 (2019); United States v. Sanford-Brown,
Ltd., 840 F.3d 445, 447 (7th Cir. 2016) (stating that the FCA’s “materiality
requirement is ‘rigorous’ and ‘demanding’” (citing Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2002–03,
2004 n.6)); United States ex rel. Marsteller v. Tilton, 880 F.3d 1302, 1312 (11th
Cir. 2018) (“The materiality standard is ‘demanding,’ and ‘rigorous.’” (citing
Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 1996, 2002)).
99 Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003 (quoting Allison Engine Co. v. United States
ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 672 (2008)).
100 Id.
101 Id. at 2002 (“We need not decide whether § 3729(a)(1)(A)’s materiality
requirement is governed by § 3729(b)(4) or derived directly from the common
law.”). See also Farringer, supra note 94, at 1255 (contending that “[t]he Escobar
Court’s decision not to address the relationship between the statutory definition
of ‘material’ found in Section 3729(b)(4) and the guidance it set forth regarding
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asserted: “Under any understanding of the concept, materiality
‘look[s] to the effect on the likely behavior of the recipient of the
alleged misrepresentation.”102 As such, the Escobar Court explained that courts adjudicating FCA claims should consider not
only whether the government had designated compliance with contract terms and applicable regulations as a precondition to payment, but also how the Government actually had responded to
noncompliance in the past.103 The Court wrote:
[P]roof of materiality can include, but is not necessarily limited to,
evidence that the defendant knows that the Government consistently refuses to pay claims in the mine run of cases based
on noncompliance with the particular statutory, regulatory, or
contractual requirement. Conversely, if the Government pays
a particular claim in full despite its actual knowledge that certain
requirements were violated, that is very strong evidence that
those requirements are not material. Or, if the Government
regularly pays a particular type of claim in full despite actual
knowledge that certain requirements were violated, and has
signaled no change in position, that is strong evidence that the
requirements are not material.104

Escobar establishes that, in the FCA context, the Government’s actual behavior is crucial to the question of materiality.105
Proving materiality therefore requires that juries be provided with
a real-world understanding of how the Government typically acts
in the face of noncompliance with statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirements. Does the Government usually pay or not?
The Tenth Circuit explains: “[R]ather than directing courts to
focus exclusively on a reasonable person—as they would under a
how to assess materiality has caused confusion among the lower courts about
how to square these two standards”).
102 Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003 (quoting RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON
CONTRACTS § 69:12, at 549 (4th ed. 2003) (emphasis added)). Escobar then
cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 538 (1977), and the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 162(2) (1981).
103 Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003 (“In sum, when evaluating materiality under
the False Claims Act, the Government’s decision to expressly identify a provision
as a condition of payment is relevant, but not automatically dispositive.”).
104 Id. at 2003–04.
105 See Farringer, supra note 94, at 1258 (explaining that “the thrust of the
Escobar opinion ... is the newly established focus on the government’s behavior
and the defendant’s knowledge of such behavior”).
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purely objective analysis—or exclusively on the mindset of the
misrepresenter—as they would under a purely subjective analysis—
Escobar focuses the materiality inquiry on the likely reaction of
the recipient.”106
Although Escobar’s materiality reasoning has been subjected to criticism,107 there is no doubt that the Court’s opinion has
had a profound impact.108 Not surprisingly, criminal defense attorneys have found the doctrinal development in Escobar rather
intriguing and they have argued that Escobar’s treatment of materiality under the False Claims Act should be extended to federal
criminal fraud cases.109 After all, the argument proceeds, if the
Government’s actual conduct is relevant to determine materiality
in the False Claims Act context, then perhaps the actions of
banks and other lenders is relevant in mail, wire and bank fraud
cases involving financial institutions.110 As we will see, however,
such arguments have been thus far unsuccessful in the federal
United States ex rel. Janssen v. Lawrence Mem’l Hosp., 949 F.3d 533,
541 (10th Cir. 2020).
107 See Joan H. Krause, Reflections on Certification, Interpretation, and the
Quest for Fraud That “Counts” Under the False Claims Act, 2017 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1811, 1833 (2017) (asserting that “[t]he single biggest weakness in the
Escobar opinion is the failure to clearly define materiality”); see also Latoya
C. Dawkins, Not So Fast: Proving Implied False Certification Theory PostEscobar, 42 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 163, 179–80 (2017) (“Escobar should have
done more to delineate what is needed to show that the misrepresentation
would have affected the government’s decision to pay.”); Kwok, supra note 80,
at 538 (arguing that Escobar “adopts an unusual materiality standard that
conflates criminal and civil law principles” and “imposes a materiality standard for civil fraud that does not reflect existing civil contract principles, and it
counterintuitively makes imposition of civil fraud liability more difficult than
criminal fraud liability”).
108 See Alexander Kristofcak, FCA v. FDA: The Case Against the Presumption of Immateriality from Agency Inaction, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 235, 246 (2020)
(“Judging from the sheer number of opinions citing Escobar, the impact of the
case is undeniable, even if the exact nature of the impact is difficult to pin down.”)
(footnote omitted); see also id. at 246 n.54 (stating that “[i]n the two and a
half years since its publication, Escobar has been cited over five hundred times,
including nearly one hundred times at the court of appeals level”).
109 See Craig Margolis & Christina Ferma, The False Claims Act: Why Should
a Civil Statute Matter to Criminal Lawyers?, 31 CRIM. JUST. 26, 28 (Winter
2017) (noting that “[c]riminal practitioners have already begun to cite Escobar in
their briefing on materiality”).
110 See id.
106
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appellate courts.111 The next section uses two recent, important
mortgage fraud cases, United States v. Lindsey, and United States
v. Raza, to explore the criminal fraud implications of Escobar.
III.POST-ESCOBAR CASE STUDIES IN MATERIALITY
A. Lindsey’s Mortgage Fraud Scheme and Trial
Nicholas Lindsey, a mortgage loan officer and real estate
broker,112 perpetrated a classic mortgage fraud scheme using straw
buyers or straw borrowers for numerous residential properties.113
In order to obtain approval for the straw buyers’ loan applications, Lindsey made the borrowers appear more creditworthy by
depositing money into their bank accounts and falsely stating their
incomes on their loan applications.114 For example, Lindsey recruited Madelon Bridges, flew her to Las Vegas, paid off her debts,
and gave her $10,000 for her role in his mortgage fraud scheme.115
Lindsey then had Bridges “sign a loan application that falsely
represented, inter alia, that she intended to live at the property
she was applying for a loan to purchase, paid $3,300 a month in
rent, was gainfully employed, and had a sizeable bank account.”116
In the end, Bridges was the named buyer of a Las Vegas house
worth $720,000, even though she actually lived in Louisiana and
only had “$50 to her name.”117 For good measure, Lindsey also used
Bridges’s personal information to take out another mortgage loan
without her knowledge.118 Bridges was only one of Lindsey’s straw
See infra Section III.A.
Lindsey II, 850 F.3d 1009, 1011 (9th Cir. 2017).
113 Id. at 1012. In a related appeal, the Ninth Circuit summed up Lindsey’s
actions as follows:
Lindsey ran an elaborate mortgage fraud scheme that targeted
vulnerable and impoverished individuals and convinced them
to act as straw buyers for properties in Las Vegas. He also stole
their identities and purchased other properties without their
knowledge. When the scheme caused foreclosures on the properties, Lindsey profited while lenders lost money and the straw
buyers were left with ruined credit.
United States v. Lindsey, 680 F. App’x 563, 567–68 (9th Cir. 2017).
114 Lindsey II, 850 F.3d at 1011.
115 Id. at 1012.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
111
112
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buyers; he “perpetrated similar frauds with five straw buyers—
including his sister—on nine home loans and eight different
properties.”119 As the Ninth Circuit explained: “The properties
secured through this scheme were destined for foreclosure, creating large losses for financial institutions while Lindsey benefitted financially from commissions, rent payments, and diverted
escrow monies.”120
The government charged Lindsey with nine counts of wire
fraud and one count of aggravated identity theft.121 Prior to trial,
the government moved to prevent Lindsey from introducing evidence of lender negligence at trial.122 The district court reserved
judgment on the matter,123 but the battle lines were drawn—the
government was going to do all that it could to prevent Lindsey
from putting the lenders on trial. As the government expected,
during the trial, Lindsey’s attorney repeatedly sought to draw
attention to the lenders’ behavior.124 This became a point of contention between Lindsey’s lawyer, the government, and the trial
judge. For example, during opening statements, District Judge
Lloyd “warned Lindsey’s attorney to ‘stay away’ from the issue
of lender negligence.”125 Lindsey’s lawyer persisted, however, as
the Ninth Circuit explains:
Nevertheless, Lindsey’s counsel described 2006 to 2007 as “a
wild time” of mortgage lending, one that he had once referred
to as the “Wild West.” It was a period, counsel said, when “there
were mortgages being offered that had never been offered before
and perhaps may never be offered again.” These mortgages included “stated income” and “no income, no assets” loans. The
Government objected to defense counsel’s description of the
loan products, arguing that it was evidence of lender negligence.
The district court allowed the description of the loans, but warned
Id.
Id. at 1011; see also id. at 1012 (noting that “Lindsey profited by receiving
significant commissions, rent payments, and diverted escrow monies” from one
of his schemes).
121 Id. at 1012.
122 Id.
123 Id. (explaining that “[t]he district court declined to rule on the issue,
concluding that a final ruling ‘would be more appropriately made in the context of the development of the evidence at trial’”).
124 Id.
125 Id.
119
120
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counsel again to “stay away” from suggesting negligence. The district court subsequently told the parties that it was “inclined”
to exclude evidence of lender negligence from the rest of trial.126

Of course, an “inclination” is not a final ruling, and the issue
of lender negligence arose again during cross-examination of government witnesses.127 The court allowed cross-examination testimony about the general state of the mortgage industry, as well as
stated income and no document loans at the time of Lindsey’s
alleged fraud.128 The district court, however, sustained the Government’s objection when Lindsey’s attorney asked a lender’s
employee specifically about “previous bad loans that her employer, a
lender, had provided.”129 In a similar vein, the court prevented
Lindsey’s counsel from eliciting testimony from a lender’s former
employee of how the employee would have responded to particular
inaccuracies regarding the applicant’s bank accounts in a loan
application.130 On the other hand, the district judge gave Lindsey’s
lawyer some latitude during closing arguments, permitting the
lawyer to make several comments, over the Government’s objection, about the frenzied state of the mortgage lending market
prior to the 2008 financial crisis and the Great Recession.131
Finally, although the district court instructed the jury that “[l]oose
Id. at 1012–13 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 1013.
128 Id. at 1013, 1018.
129 Id. at 1013. The district court apparently accepted the prosecutor’s argument that the “the district court had already ruled on the issue of lender
negligence, and so defense counsel’s question was irrelevant.” Id.
130 Id.
131 The opinion reads:
During closing arguments, Lindsey’s counsel again hit on the
lending standards previously commonplace in the mortgage
market. He explained that “[i]n 2006 and 2007 America was on a
mortgage loan high.” As a result of “[e]asy lending practices” and
“100 percent financing of a mortgage on stated income and
stated assets,” lenders made bad loans to “people [who] bought
houses they could not afford.” The Government objected to these
statements, but the district court overruled the objection. Defense counsel also told the jury that buyers and sellers of real
estate were “extremely busy,” making money very quickly, and
would sometimes make mistakes or “do things on purpose just
to close a deal.”
Id. at 1018.
126
127
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lending practices do not constitute a defense to wire fraud,”132 the
judge also stated that “the lending standards applied by the financial institutions that lent the money in this case are relevant to
the question of materiality.”133 In the end, the jury convicted Lindsey
of wire fraud and identity theft, and he was sentenced to 132 months
in prison and ordered to pay over $2 million in restitution.134
B. Lindsey I’s Per Se Materiality Rule
On appeal, Lindsey argued that the district court prevented him from presenting a complete defense in violation of
his constitutional rights.135 In particular, Lindsey claimed “that
the district court erred by preventing him from presenting evidence about the ‘stated income/no doc’ loans, thus barring him
‘from challenging the materiality of false statements on a loan
type that invites the applicant to state their income without justification or support.’”136 The Lindsey I panel began by observing
that the First Circuit had recently created a “bright-line” approach
to materiality, which it found persuasive.137 Lindsey I then explicitly
adopted the First Circuit’s bright-line test,138 and held “as a
matter of law, that when a lender requests specific information
in its loan applications, false responses to those specific requests
are objectively material for purposes of proving fraud.”139 Thus,
any of Lindsey’s arguments regarding materiality were unavailing
since, most assuredly, he had provided inaccurate information on
the many loan applications involved in the case.140
Id. at 1013, 1018.
Id.
134 Id. at 1011, 1013. Lindsey was sentenced to 108 months on the wire fraud
counts and 24 months for identity theft. Id. at 1013.
135 Id. at 1014; Lindsey I, 827 F.3d 865, 869 (9th Cir. 2016).
136 Lindsey I, 827 F.3d at 869.
137 Id. at 871 (citing United States v. Appolon, 715 F.3d 362, 368 (1st Cir.
2013); United States v. Prieto, 812 F.3d 6, 14 (1st Cir. 2016)).
138 Lindsey I, 827 F.3d at 871.
139 Id.
140 Id. (“The government introduced evidence that the lenders specifically
requested information about, inter alia, employment, income, and assets, and
that Lindsey provided false information with the intent to fraudulently secure loans.”).
132
133
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Lindsey I’s adoption of the First’s Circuit’s per se materiality rule was deeply misguided for a three reasons. First, an argument can be made that neither Appolon nor Prieto actually created
a per se materiality rule in the first instance.141 Second, even if
the First Circuit has adopted a per se materiality rule, the First
Circuit’s rule is arguably narrower than the materiality rule
enunciated by Lindsey I.142 Third, putting aside the First Circuit’s approach altogether, the per se materiality rule stated by
Lindsey I is without merit.143 This part of the Article will briefly
discuss each of these three arguments.
Undoubtedly, there is broad and incautious language in
Appolon and Prieto suggesting that materiality can be established
simply by a borrower providing incorrect information on a loan
application.144 Nevertheless, a close reading of Appolon and Prieto
calls into question whether those are the First Circuit’s actual
holdings in those two cases.145 Most important, in both Appolon
See infra text accompanying notes 139–50.
See infra text accompanying notes 151–53.
143 See infra text accompanying notes 154–56.
144 For example, in Appolon, the court asserted that because the application
forms for one of the transactions “specifically sought information regarding the
purchaser’s income, assets, and intent to reside in the property, all of which were
designed to assess the borrower’s creditworthiness,” United States v. Appolon,
715 F.3d 362, 368 (1st Cir. 2013), this indicated that the “responses were capable
of influencing its decision.” Id. In addition, in Prieto, the First Circuit asserts that:
[I]t is ... fair to presume that a loan applicant’s stated income
level and plans for using the property in question would have
a “natural tendency” to influence a lender’s decision. Why else,
after all, did the lender demand the information and Prieto take
the risk of providing false information?
United States v. Prieto, 812 F.3d 6, 14 (1st Cir. 2016). This rhetorical question is
particularly unfortunate. That is exactly what a criminal fraud prosecution
must establish—that the defendant provided false information as part of a
scheme to defraud someone and that the information is material. One cannot
elide the question by simply proclaiming that a lie must be legally significant
because, well, why would one party ask for information and why would someone lie in response to the request?
145 The line between a holding and dicta can be frustrating to discern here.
In Prieto, the First Circuit describes Appolon as follows: “In that case, the
government’s evidence that the victim lender had ‘explicitly sought’ information from the fraudulent applicant and had received false information in
return satisfied the government’s burden on that element.” Prieto, 812 F.3d
at 13 (quoting Appolon, 715 F.3d at 368). Prieto then states: “We ruled that
141
142
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and Prieto there was witness testimony before the jury that went to
the question of materiality.146 Neither case relied solely on the
fact that the lenders requested the information as conclusive
proof that the information provided was material.147 For example, in Appolon, although the government had not presented any
witness testimony regarding the loan evaluation process for one
of the transactions involved in the fraud scheme,148 the First
Circuit contended that the jury reasonably could rely on witness
testimony regarding the lending protocols for another lender involved in the case to consider the materiality of the defendant’s
misrepresentations—especially given the substantial similarities in the lenders’ applications.149 Thus, in Appolon, there was
some witness testimony about loan procedures relevant to the
question of materiality.150
Similarly, in Prieto, the jury heard lay witness testimony
from “a mortgage broker with a decade of experience in the industry and a cooperating witness who had submitted numerous
loan applications on Prieto’s behalf.”151 Although the defendant
argued that the witness “did not have insight into the particular
underwriting practices of the victim institutions during the relevant time period,”152 the First Circuit determined that his testimony was relevant to the question of materiality.153 Regardless
of whether the materiality evidence ought to have been deemed
sufficient in either Prieto or Appolon, the important point here is
that both cases involved witness testimony in addition to the
proof that the loan documents contained false statements.154
‘[t]he fact that [the lender’s] loan application explicitly sought [certain] information
from the applicant indicates that [the defendant’s] responses were capable of
influencing its decision.’” Id. (quoting Appolon, 715 F.3d at 368–69). At the same
time, however, Prieto explicitly acknowledges that the evidence in Appolon “was
helpfully accompanied by testimony from an officer of a different mortgage
lender about the range of criteria relevant to that lender’s loan processing
procedures.” Prieto, 812 F.3d at 13 (citing Appolon, 715 F.3d at 368–69).
146 See Appolon, 715 F.3d at 368–69; Prieto, 812 F.3d at 13–14.
147 See Appolon, 715 F.3d at 369; Prieto, 812 F.3d at 14.
148 Appolon, 715 F.3d at 368.
149 Id. at 369.
150 See id. at 368–69.
151 Prieto, 812 F.3d at 14.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Appolon, 715 F.3d 362, 368–69 (1st Cir. 2013); Prieto, 812 F.3d at 14.
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Neither case relied solely on loan document falsehoods alone to
establish materiality.155
Second, to the extent that Appolon and Prieto did create a
bright-line materiality test, the Lindsey I panel’s holding arguably
was even broader than in those two cases. In Prieto, the First
Circuit states that “it is ... fair to presume that a loan applicant’s
stated income level and plans for using the property in question
would have a ‘natural tendency’ to influence a lender’s decision.”156
The exact language is important. It is one thing to have a judicially
created materiality presumption in mortgage loan applications for
false statements about the borrower’s income and their plans to
reside in the property—these are undeniably two of the most important items on any mortgage loan application—but it is quite
another to hold, as Lindsey I did, that any false responses in a loan
application with respect to any matter are, as a matter of law, material.157 That is a much broader, and more dubious, proposition.158
This leads to the third and ultimate flaw in Lindsey I’s
materiality holding. Even if Lindsey I had been correct that to
conclude that the First Circuit has a true bright-line per se materiality rule, following this rule was inadvisable on the merits.
The simplicity of such a per se materiality rule is only matched
by its vacuity. Think about the implications of this reasoning—
that any time a party to a contract, such as a mortgage loan
agreement, requests information from another party, by definition, the request alone proves that the information is material,
independent of any evidence about its potential significance to
any decision-making processes.159 Such an approach eviscerates
See Appolon, 715 F.3d at 368–69; Prieto, 812 F.3d at 14.
Prieto, 812 F.3d at 14; see also Appolon, 715 F.3d at 368 (noting that
the loan file for one of the transactions “included application forms that specifically sought information regarding the purchaser’s income, assets, and
intent to reside in the property, all of which were designed to assess the borrower’s
creditworthiness”).
157 Lindsey I, 827 F.3d at 871.
158 Even a presumption regarding income overstatement might still be inadvisable, but at least it is relatively narrow. See Prieto, 812 F.3d at 14 (because “residential mortgage lenders were devoting scant resources to the
verification of applicants’ income levels, it is nevertheless fair to presume
that a loan applicant’s stated income level and plans for using the property in
question would have a ‘natural tendency’ to influence a lender’s decision”).
159 Conversely, the Second Circuit has held “that contractual disclaimers of
reliance on prior misrepresentations do not render those misrepresentations
155
156
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the very nature of materiality. Why have materiality as a separate
element of a criminal offense, if we presume materiality when
the falsity of the statement in response to an inquiry has been
established?160 In order to understand why this is a misguided
approach, we now will turn to Lindsey II, which discarded the
bright-line rule from Lindsey I, and even more tellingly, did not
even cite the First Circuit’s opinions in Prieto and Appolon.161
The excision of these First Circuit precedents in Lindsey II is an
implicit concession of the flawed reasoning in Lindsey I, and a
repudiation of the First Circuit’s alleged per se materiality rule.
C. Lindsey II: Distinguishing Escobar and Adopting Rigid
Evidentiary Rules
Escobar, provided the Ninth Circuit with a justification for
granting rehearing in Lindsey.162 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit once
again rejected Lindsey’s claim that he had been prevented from
presenting a complete defense.163 To get to that point, though, the
Ninth Circuit in Lindsey II was compelled to address Escobar.164
As Judge Gould explained: “According to Lindsey, Escobar directs
that factfinders in a mortgage fraud prosecution be free to consider
any evidence of lender behavior, including how an individual lender
treats a particular false statement on its loan applications.”165
immaterial under the criminal mail and wire fraud statutes.” United States v.
Weaver, 860 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 2017); see also United States v. Ghilarducci,
480 F.3d 542, 547 (7th Cir. 2007) (rejecting the argument that contracts should
have put fraud victims on notice that oral representations would not be honored and thus were “immaterial or without tendency to influence”).
160 See United States v. Rigas, 490 F.3d 208, 231 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The simple
fact that the Co-Borrowing Agreements required information does not make any
misstatement of that information per se material.”) (citing United States v.
Rodriguez, 140 F.3d 163, 168 (2d Cir. 1998)).
161 Lindsey II, 850 F.3d 1009, 1019 (9th Cir. 2017).
162 See Shin v. United States, No. CR 04-00150 SOM, 2017 WL 2802866, at
*1 (D. Haw. June 28, 2017) (explaining that Escobar led to the Ninth Circuit’s
rehearing of Lindsey I), aff’d, 782 F. App’x 595 (9th Cir. 2019)).
163 Lindsey II, 850 F.3d at 1019. In fact, the Ninth Circuit suggested that
the district court had been too generous, by allowing Lindsey to introduce evidence
that would not be admissible according to the Lindsey court’s reasoning. Id.
at 1018–19.
164 Id. at 1016–17.
165 Id. at 1017.
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Put another way, Lindsey argued that Escobar requires trial
courts to allow criminal fraud defendants to introduce proof about
the subjective decision-making processes of those who are the
recipients of a falsehood in a fraud scheme—such as banks and
other financial institutions.166
Lindsey II rejected this reading of Escobar.167 As opposed
to Lindsey I, with its ill-advised adoption of a per se materiality
rule borrowed from the First Circuit, Judge Gould thoughtfully
and carefully worked to explicate and reconcile several principles
and precedents regarding federal fraud law.168 Most important
for its analysis, the Court of Appeals contended that materiality
under the wire fraud statute is evaluated under an objective
test.169 As the court explained: “This standard is not concerned
with a statement’s subjective effect on the victim, but only the
‘the intrinsic capabilities of the false statement itself.’”170 The
idea of objective materiality undergirds the Ninth Circuit’s
analysis in Lindsey II. Connected to this point, the Ninth Circuit
stated that so-called “lender negligence in verifying loan application information, or even intentional disregard of the information, is not a defense to fraud.”171 After all, the thinking goes,
if we care only about the intrinsic capabilities of a false statement
and its actual effects (successful or otherwise), then the actions
of the lender, whether negligent or otherwise, should have no
Id.
Id. at 1017–18.
168 Lindsey II begins with the two basic principles that are beyond dispute:
materiality is an element of the wire fraud offense, id. at 1013, but proof of
reliance or actual damages is not required. Id. at 1014–15.
169 Id. at 1014 (“The element of materiality is evaluated under an objective
test, in which we must examine ‘the intrinsic capabilities of the false statement itself, rather than the possibility of the actual attainment of its end.’”
(quoting United States v. Peterson, 538 F.3d 1064, 1072 (9th Cir. 2008))); see
also id. at 1015 (“A false statement is material if it objectively had a tendency
to influence, or was capable of influencing, a lender to approve a loan.”).
170 Id. at 1015 (quoting United States v. Peterson, 538 F.3d 1064, 1072
(9th Cir. 2008)).
171 Id. at 1011–12 (“[W]e hold that lender negligence in verifying loan application information, or even intentional disregard of the information, is not
a defense to fraud, and so evidence of such negligence or intentional disregard by particular lenders is inadmissible as a defense against charges of
mortgage fraud.”).
166
167
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bearing on the question of materiality.172 As Judge Easterbrook
explained in an earlier mail fraud case, “Once the Supreme
Court excludes reliance as a separate element of the mail-fraud
offense, it will not do for appellate judges to roll reliance into
materiality; that would add through the back door an element
barred from the front.”173 To do so would threaten the very nature of criminal fraud as an inchoate offense.174
Judge Gould was unconvinced that Escobar disturbed this
basic understanding of federal criminal fraud law.175 He distinguished Escobar by drawing a distinction between the context of
the False Claims Act, which protects the United States Government, and federal anti-fraud laws, which cover an entire marketplace of lenders:
[Lindsey’s] interpretation misses that the Federal Government
in an FCA case is in a far different position than is an individual lender in a mortgage fraud prosecution. A single lender
represents only some small part of the market for issuing
mortgages. The Federal Government, by contrast, represents
the entire market for issuing federal government contracts.
The weight the Government gives to a particular statutory,
regulatory, or contractual requirement is analogous not to the
weight an individual lender gives to a statement on its loan
application, but rather the weight the entire mortgage industry gives to that type of statement.
This difference matters because materiality measures natural
capacity to influence, not whether the statement actually influenced any decision .... The way the entire market has historically treated a statement or requirement says a lot about
that statement or requirement’s natural capacity to influence
a decision by market participants. But the way one market
participant of many has previously treated a statement says
little or nothing about that statement’s inherent ability to affect decision making.176

See United States v. Svete, 556 F.3d 1157, 1165 (11th Cir. 2009) (en banc)
(“A perpetrator of fraud is no less guilty of fraud because his victim is also
guilty of negligence.”).
173 United States v. Rosby, 454 F.3d 670, 674 (7th Cir. 2006).
174 See Buell, supra note 46 (explaining the inchoate nature of fraud as a
criminal offense).
175 Lindsey II, 850 F.3d at 1017.
176 Id. (citation omitted).
172
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Lindsey II thus theorizes that subjective and objective
materiality standards essentially merge in the Escobar context
of the False Claims Act—how the Federal Government hypothetically would respond to explicit or implicit misrepresentations is
basically the same as how the Government routinely does respond
to such misstatements.177 The same cannot be said for fraud against
financial institutions where, according to the Ninth Circuit, “the
way one market participant of many has previously treated a
statement says little or nothing about that statement’s inherent
ability to affect decision making.”178
Ultimately, based upon its objective understanding of materiality and its reading of Escobar, the Court of Appeals in
Lindsey II determined that “the district court did not deny Lindsey
the opportunity to present a complete defense.”179 If anything,
Ninth Circuit opined that the district court had been a bit too
generous “by allowing the jury to consider ... evidence of particular
lenders’ standards that might have squeaked its way into the record.”180 Just to make sure that the principles enunciated by
Lindsey II were not misinterpreted by the district courts, the
Ninth Circuit laid out its four holdings as follows:
In conclusion, we hold the following: (1) negligence is not a defense
to wire fraud, and evidence of lender negligence is not admissible as a defense to mortgage fraud; (2) intentional disregard
of relevant information is not a defense to wire fraud, and evidence of intentional disregard by lenders is not admissible as
a defense to mortgage fraud; (3) evidence of individual lender
behavior is not admissible to disprove materiality, but evidence
of general lending standards in the mortgage industry is admissible to disprove materiality; and (4) the district court did not
deny Lindsey the opportunity to present a complete defense.181

The Ninth Circuit thus drew a clear line: criminal mortgage
fraud defendants can challenge the materiality of false statements
A similar point is made by the Fourth Circuit in Raza. See infra notes
207–08 and accompanying text.
178 Lindsey II, 850 F.3d at 1017.
179 Id. at 1019 (explaining that throughout the trial, “the district court allowed
Lindsey to argue and present evidence that his false statements were not material in light of general industry lending standards”).
180 Id.
181 Id.
177
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with evidence about industry practices,182 but are forbidden from
introducing or relying on evidence about individual lenders.183
In Judge Gould’s view, “[t]his line between evidence of industry
practice and the practice of particular lenders is subtle,”184 but it
reflects the best way to respect both Escobar and the objective
conception of materiality in federal criminal fraud cases.185
D. United States v. Raza
1. Background
In United States v. Raza, the Fourth Circuit also addressed
the implications of Escobar on criminal fraud cases involving financial institutions.186 The Raza panel had the benefit not only of
Justice Thomas’s opinion in Escobar, but also the Ninth Circuit’s
opinion in Lindsey II. The fraud scheme in Raza involved four employees of the SunTrust Mortgage branch in Annandale, Virginia:187
Mohsin Raza managed the branch; Raza’s wife, Humaira Iqbal,
worked as his personal assistant; and Farukh Iqbal and Mohammad
Ali Haider, both of whom are Humaira’s brothers, worked as loan
officers in the same SunTrust office.188 Raza and Humaira also acted
as loan officers at the branch.189 The fraud scheme was extensive:190
it involved twenty-five mortgage loans made on thirteen properties
in Virginia.191 As the Fourth Circuit exhaustively detailed, the four
Id. at 1016. As an example, Judge Gould explained that “defendants can
offer testimony about the types of information, such as household income or assets,
that lenders typically consider, as well as evidence of how much weight the
industry generally gives to statements about such information.” Id.
183 Id. (“As long as defendants do not stray into evidence of the behavior of
individual lenders—for instance, evidence of specific prior bad loans or particular mistakes by underwriters—defendants may attack materiality though
industry practice.”).
184 Id.
185 Id. at 1016–17.
186 United States v. Raza, 876 F.3d 604, 619–21 (4th Cir. 2017).
187 Id. at 607. The Fourth Circuit explained that the fraud scheme affected
both parent and subsidiary banking entities, but that the distinctions between
the entities were immaterial for the purpose of the discussion. Id. at 606 n.1.
188 Id. at 608.
189 Id.
190 See id. at 607 n.6 (describing key elements of the indictment).
191 Id. at 607.
182
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defendants helped to originate numerous mortgage loan applications containing inaccurate borrower information—especially with
respect to job titles, income, and bank savings on deposit.192 These
mortgage applications often were supported by false tax and payroll
documents obtained or prepared by the defendants.193 Many of
the false tax documents were produced by Ranjit Singh, a tax
preparer who cooperated with the prosecution.194
It is vitally important to note that the jury was apprised not
only of the facts of these mortgage loan application misrepresentations, but also that the jurors heard testimony as to why such
Astonishingly enough, the four defendants in Raza claimed to have worked
at SunTrust for only a year, during the pre–Great Recession mortgage lending
boom, and that the government waited nine years to indict them for their crimes.
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, United States v. Raza, 876 F.3d 604 (4th Cir.
2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2679 (2018) (No. 17-1314), available on Westlaw at
2018 WL 1394194, at 3–4 [hereinafter Raza Cert. Petition].
193 Raza, 876 F.3d at 609–10. They even had a branch employee impersonate
a tenant’s landlord to confirm rental information with SunTrust’s underwriters.
Id. at 609.
194 Id. Seven vivid examples will give the reader a sense of the types of
misrepresentations involved in the Raza mortgage fraud scheme: (1) Reynaldo
Valdez, obtained a home mortgage loan for $414,000 from SunTrust. Id. at 610.
His application indicated that he was a dentist who earned over $100,000 per
year and that he had almost $70,000 in the bank. Id. In reality, he worked in
his sister’s medical office doing clerical and maintenance work for far less
income. Id. (2) Harwinder Singh, obtained $470,000 in SunTrust mortgage loans
in his wife’s name. Id. The loan application stated that Mrs. Singh worked as
a systems engineer and that she made almost $15,000 per month and had
$45,000 on deposit at Wachovia Bank. Id. In fact, she earned only $25,000 per
year and did not have a bank account with Wachovia. Id. (3) Santos Valdez-Mejia,
who worked as a cook and a manual laborer, obtained $405,000 in mortgage
loans from SunTrust. Id. at 610–11. His loan file indicated that he earned almost
$10,000 per month and that he worked as an area manager for a restaurant
chain. Id. at 610. (4) Francy Castillo’s loan application falsely stated that she
“was president of a company called NGDC, earned a monthly salary of $17,000,
and had $100,000 in a Wachovia bank.” Id. at 611. In reality, Castillo worked “two
hourly jobs—as a waitress and as a caretaker,” and “she never had $100,000
in any bank.” Id. (5) Khalid Yousaf, a cab driver, who also operated a Dollar
Store. Id. Yousaf earned about $3,000 per month, but his mortgage refinancing
application falsely stated that he was a vice president of a business and that
he earned $13,000 per month. Id. (6) Juan Pablo Yanez’s loan application
“reflected that he was president of a construction company and earned more than
$11,000 per month,” but he “was actually a laborer earning hourly wages.” Id. (7)
Finally, Jagtar Dhanoa worked as a cab driver and at Pizza Hut as a cook, but his
loan application “falsely indicated he was a senior analyst at Ikon Solutions.” Id.
192
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information was significant in the lending process.195 In particular,
“Barbara Daloia, a vice-president of SunTrust’s national underwriting team in North Carolina, explained the potential consequences to SunTrust of loan applicants failing to submit accurate
information on mortgage loan applications.”196 Daloia also “emphasized the significance to SunTrust of the information required
on its loan applications,”197 and “stressed that supporting documents were similarly important to SunTrust’s loan process—
such as those required for full document loans and stated income,
stated asset loans—because those documents authenticate the
information on the loan application.”198
Just as important, the defendants in Raza were permitted
to have their own witnesses testify about SunTrust’s “originateto-sell” mortgage business model199 and the firm’s purportedly
reckless lending policies during the period of the alleged mortgage
fraud scheme.200 According to a former SunTrust underwriter,
Terri Dougherty:
Id. at 611–12.
Id. at 611.
197 Id. at 612.
198 Id.
199 Id.; see also FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE
FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 542 (2011), https://www
.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6AQ
-NBAJ] (defining “originate-to-distribute” as “[w]hen lenders make loans with
the intention of selling them to other financial institutions or investors, as
opposed to holding the loans through maturity”). One scholar explains:
A more sophisticated secondary market for mortgages developed
in the 1970s. Banks, aided by the GSEs, began to securitize mortgages, selling pools of mortgage loans to intermediaries who sold
securities backed by those loans to investors. Investors in the
securitized mortgages then bore the interest rate, prepayment,
and default risk associated with the underlying loans apart from
a small residual interest typically maintained by the originator.
Many banks thus moved from an originate-to-hold model to
an originate-to-distribute model, transferring most of their mortgage loans to special purpose vehicles that issued and sold securities to investors.
Paul G. Mahoney, Deregulation and the Subprime Crisis, 104 VA. L. REV. 235,
243 (2018) (footnote omitted).
200 Raza, 876 F.3d at 612–13.
195
196
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SunTrust aggressively sought to originate mortgage loans in
order to sell them on the secondary mortgage market. SunTrust
attempted to sell loans immediately after origination, before
the SunTrust borrowers could default and undermine the loans’
marketability. Dougherty believed this business model encouraged SunTrust employees to prioritize economic metrics
that attracted secondary loan purchasers—such as good credit
scores of borrowers—and to disregard other information on the
SunTrust loan applications. For example, Dougherty asserted
that SunTrust discouraged its mortgage loan underwriters from
raising red flags when loan applications contained questionable
information concerning income, employment, and assets, so long
as the borrowers’ credit scores were adequate. Dougherty also
maintained that SunTrust supervisors would sometimes override her decisions to defer action on loan applications and to
request additional supporting documents.201

Another expert witness for the defense, Robert MacLaverty
opined that:
SunTrust’s mid-Atlantic region had engaged in reckless lending
practices and approved more than ninety-eight percent of its
residential mortgage loan applications during the period of the
fraud scheme .... In contrast, SunTrust’s competitors approved
about eighty percent of similar loan applications during that
period .... MacLaverty believed that secondary market purchasers
deemed credit scores of borrowers to be one of the most important economic metrics in their evaluations of loan acquisitions .... MacLaverty further opined that SunTrust’s pattern
of expeditiously selling originated loans to secondary market
purchasers minimized SunTrust’s exposure to the risk of borrowers defaulting on SunTrust loans.202

Thus, the defendants in Raza were quite successful at getting
their “reckless lender” story in front of the jury, even if they
were unable to obtain the jury charge on materiality that they
wanted from the district court.203
After a jury trial, all four defendants were convicted of
wire fraud involving a financial institution and conspiracy to
Id. at 612.
Id. at 612–13
203 Id. at 615 (noting that the defendants’ witnesses were able to testify “that
SunTrust had engaged in reckless lending practices and disregarded false
information in loan applications”).
201
202
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commit wire fraud.204 On appeal, the defendants argued that the
trial court’s instruction as to materiality was defective because
“the court erroneously gave the jury an objective—or ‘reasonable
lender’—standard of materiality,”205 where it should have advised “the jury that it had to find ... that the defendants’ misrepresentations and false statements were subjectively material to
the fraud’s victim.”206 As in Lindsey II, the defendants in Raza
specifically invoked Escobar.207 The Fourth Circuit explained:
“The defendants’ contention of error on the materiality element
apparently comes to this: They want us to utilize [Escobar] to
rule that the Supreme Court has clarified its earlier cases to say
that materiality—in any criminal fraud context—requires proof
that the false statements and misrepresentations were subjectively material.”208
2. The Raza Decision
In the end, the Fourth Circuit rejected the defendants’ arguments regarding materiality.209 The Raza court arrived at two
related legal conclusions similar to Lindsey II: first, an objective
standard of materiality applies in cases involving fraud against
private lenders; and second, nothing in Escobar changes that
principle or warrants the application of a subjective materiality
standard in criminal fraud cases involving financial institutions.210
As for the first point, the Raza court relied heavily on Neder,211
in addition to a recent Fourth Circuit bank fraud case, United
States v. Wolf.212 According to the Court of Appeals, in Neder,
“the Supreme Court endorsed an objective, reasonable person
Id. at 607.
Id. at 614. The defendants raised two other arguments on appeal, which
will not be addressed here. Id. at 613. This Article will limit its focus to the
materiality issue.
206 Id. at 614.
207 Id. at 615.
208 Id. at 620.
209 Id. at 621.
210 Id. at 620–21.
211 Id. at 616–18.
212 United States v. Wolf, 860 F.3d 175, 193 (4th Cir. 2017). Even though
Wolf was decided more than a year after Escobar, the panel in Wolf did not address
the implications of Escobar. See Raza, 876 F.3d at 619 n.8.
204
205
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standard for materiality in the context of wire fraud against
private lending institutions.”213 Moreover, in Wolf, the Court of
Appeals plainly stated that “the test for whether a false statement to a bank is material is an objective one; it does not change
from bank to bank.”214 Instead, as Raza explained, “frauds perpetrated on private lending institutions are judged according to an
objective, ‘reasonable financial institution’ standard.”215 Although
the Fourth Circuit’s endorsement of an objective materiality test
in Raza was accompanied by additional discussion, the combination of Raza’s reading of Neder and the recent circuit precedent
in Wolf pretty much settled the issue for the Court of Appeals.216
The only question, then, for the Fourth Circuit was whether
Escobar somehow dictated a contrary outcome and thus, perhaps,
whether Wolf was erroneously decided.217 The answer was no.
The Court of Appeals determined that Escobar’s more subjective
materiality standard does not apply in criminal fraud cases involving financial institutions,218 contending that it was unlikely
Raza, 876 F.3d at 618 (“In determining that Congress intended to incorporate common law materiality principles into those offenses, the Neder Court
relied on the objective materiality test spelled out in the Second Restatement of
Torts.”) (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 22 n.5 (1999)). Oddly, as Raza
cites Neder citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts here, the second subpart of
the Restatement’s materiality test (the subjective prong) seems to vanish. Id.
214 Wolf, 860 F.3d at 193; Raza, 876 F.3d at 618 (discussing Wolf).
215 See Raza, 876 F.3d at 618 (“More than fifteen years prior to Wolf—and
post-Neder—our Court explained that frauds perpetrated on private lending
institutions are judged according to an objective, ‘reasonable financial institution’ standard.” (citing United States v. Colton, 231 F.3d 890, 903 n.5 (4th
Cir. 2000))).
216 Id. at 618.
217 Id. at 619 (explaining that the defendants specifically argued that Wolf
was wrongly decided in light of Escobar).
218 One argument proffered by the panel in Raza against the extension of
Escobar will not be explored in depth here. The Fourth Circuit noted that Justice
Thomas actually cited both objective and subjective materiality tests in Escobar,
and then opined that there is no true tension between the objective and subjective materiality tests in this context. See id. at 621 (“The Court’s juxtaposition of those two standards suggests that they are not in tension. Put another
way, an objective test of materiality does in fact ‘look to the effect on the likely or
actual behavior of the recipient.’” (quoting Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2002)). Raza
then concluded that both standards lead to the conclusion that “the jury should
assess in its materiality inquiry is a reasonable lender in SunTrust’s position—
not necessarily SunTrust itself.” Id. Regardless of whether the ultimate conclusion
213
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that Escobar extended past qui tam actions that protect the federal
government.219 In support of this point, Raza cited a recent case,
United States v. Palin,220 in which the Fourth Circuit had declined
to apply Escobar in the context of health care fraud, stating: “We
do not believe the Supreme Court intended to broadly ‘overrule’
materiality standards that had previously applied in the context
of criminal fraud.”221 The Fourth Circuit then distinguished cases
like Escobar, which “involved a civil fraud scheme that had targeted the federal government,” from cases involving private
lenders.222 As the Fourth Circuit explained, “when the victim is
the government, the prosecution must prove materiality by reference to the particular government agency or public officials that
were targeted,”223 therefore “[i]n such a circumstance, the applicable materiality test verges toward a subjective standard.”224 Accordingly, in cases involving false statements made to government
agencies or public decision-making bodies, subjective materiality
evidence (i.e., how the targeted decision-maker would respond or
actually has responded in the past to such misrepresentations)
is relevant.225 In fact, not only would such evidence be admissible
for the defense, the prosecution might need to proffer such subjective materiality evidence to establish its case-in-chief.
Although subjective materiality evidence might be relevant in a case involving fraud against the government, according
to Raza, the same is not true for cases involving fraud against
is correct (which it very well may be) the reasoning leading there in this paragraph
of Raza is rather opaque. It is not evident how Escobar’s citation of both materiality standards, without more, leads to the conclusion that the two standards
are not in tension, nor why this means that a reasonable lender standard necessarily applies in all cases. Once again, the conclusion may be correct, but the
reasoning requires further elaboration.
219 See id. at 620.
220 Id. (citing United States v. Palin, 874 F.3d 418, 420 (4th Cir. 2017)).
221 Palin, 874 F.3d at 423.
222 Raza, 876 F.3d at 621.
223 Id. at 617.
224 Id. at 621; see also id. at 616 (“Pursuant to Neder, the test for materiality
in a fraud scheme targeting the federal government verges toward the subjective.”) (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16 (2019)).
225 Id. at 617 (citing cases involving false statements to public decision-making
bodies, including United States v. Camick, 796 F.3d 1206, 1217–19 (10th Cir.
2015); United States v. Litvak, 808 F.3d 160, 174 (2d Cir. 2015); and United
States v. Ismail, 97 F.3d 50 (4th Cir. 1996)).
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financial institutions.226 To support this point, Raza quoted Lindsey
II, to illuminate why a single private lender in the mortgage
market is not analogous to the federal government:
A single lender represents only some small part of the market
for issuing mortgages. The Federal Government, by contrast,
represents the entire market for issuing federal government
contracts. The weight the Government gives to a particular
statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement is analogous
not to the weight an individual lender gives to a statement on
its loan application, but rather the weight the entire mortgage
industry gives to that type of statement.227

In sum, like the Ninth Circuit in Lindsey II, the Fourth
Circuit in Raza declined to extend the Escobar Court’s subjective
materiality standard to cases involving criminal frauds perpetrated
against private lenders or financial institutions.228 Thus, the Fourth
Circuit held that the district court did not err by refusing to give
the materiality instruction requested by the defendants.229
E. Summary: The Key Lesson of Lindsey II and Raza
There is one key lesson that can be drawn from Lindsey II
and Raza: the federal courts of appeals thus far have rejected
defendants’ arguments that the “subjective”230 materiality standard
enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Escobar should
be applied to criminal fraud cases involving financial institutions.231 This has been a losing argument. Instead, the circuit
Id. at 616.
Id. at 621 (quoting Lindsey II, 850 F.3d 1009, 1017 (9th Cir. 2017)).
228 Id. at 620.
229 Id. at 621.
230 The characterization of the Escobar standard as “subjective” could be
debated. See Dawkins, supra note 107, at 178 (asserting that “[u]nder Escobar,
the government and relators must meet both the objective and subjective standards when judging if a misrepresentation was material to the decision to its pay”)
(footnotes omitted). But this is the argument pressed by criminal fraud defendants, so it is suitable for the purposes of this discussion. Raza, 876 F.3d at 620.
231 See United States v. Robertson, 760 F. App’x 214, 219–20 (4th Cir. 2019)
(quoting Raza, 876 F.3d at 620) (explaining that Raza “noted that the subjective
materiality standard articulated by the Supreme Court in [Escobar] ... a False
Claims Act case—likely does not extend ‘beyond the context of qui tam actions,’ which are ‘civil proceeding[s] that protect[ ] the federal government’”).
226
227
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courts to consider the issue in Escobar’s wake steadfastly have
maintained that an objective materiality standard applies in mail,
wire and bank fraud cases.232 As the Fourth Circuit stated in Raza:
“[T]he correct test for materiality ... is an objective one, which
measures a misrepresentation’s capacity to influence an objective
‘reasonable lender,’ not a renegade lender with a demonstrated
habit of disregarding materially false information.”233
IV.MATERIALITY EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL FRAUD CASES
A. Lindsey II’s Prophylactic Rules
Although Lindsey II and Raza arrived at basically the same
conclusion with respect to post-Escobar materiality standards in
federal fraud cases involving financial institutions, the Ninth
and Fourth Circuits differed in one fundamental manner: how to
treat the admission of evidence regarding lending practices. As
discussed earlier, in Lindsey II, the Ninth Circuit specifically
held that neither evidence of lender negligence nor evidence of
intentional regard of relevant information could be admissible as
a defense in a criminal mortgage fraud case.234 The Ninth Circuit
went further, however, holding that “evidence of individual lender
behavior is not admissible to disprove materiality, but evidence
See Lindsey II, 850 F.3d at 1014–17; United States v. Betts-Gaston, 860
F.3d 525, 532 (7th Cir. 2017) (“[W]hether a statement is material depends on
its effect on ‘a reasonable person’—or, in this case, a reasonable lender.”); Raza,
876 F.3d at 620–21; see also United States v. Lucas, 709 F. App’x. 119, 123
(3d Cir. 2017) (“[M]ateriality is an objective test, and requires showing that a
defendant’s misrepresentations would have been important to a reasonable person
deciding whether to take the requested action, not that the victim actually relied
on those misrepresentations.”); United States v. Mazumder, 800 F. App’x 392,
396 (6th Cir. 2020) (explaining that “the concept of materiality ... involves the
tendency or capacity to influence a reasonable person’s decision and does not
require actual reliance on the part of the victim”); Shin v. United States, No. CR
04-00150 SOM, 2017 WL 2802866, at *22 (D. Haw. June 28, 2017) (“Escobar
does not alter the applicable objective materiality standard. Rather, Escobar
clarifies what types of evidence may be relevant in proving materiality depending
on the facts of a particular case. Lindsey II clearly emphasizes that materiality
continues to be evaluated under an objective standard and applies that standard
in the wire fraud context.”).
233 Raza, 876 F.3d at 621.
234 Lindsey II, 850 F.3d at 1019.
232
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of general lending standards in the mortgage industry is admissible to disprove materiality.”235 Thus, the Ninth Circuit went
from a per se materiality rule in Lindsey I, which would have
made virtually all evidence about materiality outside of the loan
application itself and any supporting documents irrelevant and
inadmissible,236 to a prophylactic “bright-line rule against evidence of individual lender behavior”237 in Lindsey II.
Needless to say, the Ninth Circuit did not have to bake its
conclusions about materiality into rigid evidentiary rules in
Lindsey II. The Lindsey II panel itself acknowledged that it was
making an explicit policy judgment that a prophylactic evidentiary rule was superior to the alternatives.238 In fact, the Court
of Appeals identified one possible option as follows: “We recognize that an alternative possible rule would be to allow evidence
of past behavior by individual lenders, but require a jury instruction
that the evidence be considered only for the purpose of evaluating
materiality, and not negligence, intentional disregard, or lack of
reliance.”239 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit rejected other such
approaches, asserting that because “individual lender behavior
can easily touch on lender negligence, intentional disregard, or
lack of reliance—none of which is a defense to mortgage fraud,”240
permitting “evidence of prior non-reliance by lenders would still
lead factfinders to consider whether the victims themselves relied on the defendant’s false statements.”241 The Lindsey II panel
thus concluded that “[a] prophylactic rule against all evidence of
individual lender behavior best avoids” the court’s concerns
about jury confusion.242
Id.
See supra notes 135–61 and accompanying text (discussing the per se
materiality rule established by Lindsey I).
237 Lindsey II, 850 F.3d at 1017.
238 Id. at 1018.
239 Id. at 1017 (citations omitted).
240 Id.
241 Id. at 1018. Lindsey II also cites FED. R. EVID. 403, which states: “The
court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing
the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”
242 Lindsey II, 850 F.3d at 1018.
235
236

2021] FRAUD AGAINST FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

667

B. Supervisory Powers
Lindsey II does not explain the source of its authority to
establish these prophylactic evidentiary rules for future criminal
fraud cases. This is not to say that the Ninth Circuit acted outside of its authority, but merely to note that it is not addressed
in Judge Gould’s opinion. It could be claimed, perhaps, that the
Ninth Circuit was acting pursuant to what are sometimes called
supervisory authority or supervisory powers.243 The sources and
scope of the federal courts’ supervisory powers have been the
subject of significant scholarly attention.244 Questions about the
limits of supervisory powers run even deeper when it is the federal courts of appeals, as opposed to the Supreme Court,245 that
are exercising these implicit powers.246 Nevertheless, in Thomas
v. Arn, the Supreme Court asserted: “It cannot be doubted that
the courts of appeals have supervisory powers that permit, at
the least, the promulgation of procedural rules governing the
management of litigation.”247 Thus, there is plausible authority
for the Ninth Circuit’s action here.248
See Amy Coney Barrett, The Supervisory Power of the Supreme Court,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 324, 330 (2006) (“In some instances, courts use the term
‘supervisory authority’ to refer to the power of an appellate court to supervise
lower courts by prescribing procedures for them above and beyond those required
by statutory and constitutional provisions.”).
244 See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal
Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts,
84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433 (1984); Barrett, supra note 243.
245 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000) (“The law in this
area is clear. This Court has supervisory authority over the federal courts, and
we may use that authority to prescribe rules of evidence and procedure that are
binding in those tribunals.”) (citing Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416,
426 (1996)).
246 See 15A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION § 3901 (2d ed. 1984) (referring to the courts’ of appeals’
supervisory powers as “scantily defined”); see also United States v. Strothers,
77 F.3d 1389, 1398 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Sentelle, J., concurring) (asserting that
“unclear ... where the courts of appeals derive the power to control the practice of
the district courts when it is not constitutionally mandated”).
247 Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 146 (1985).
248 Given the uncertain boundaries of the federal appellate courts’ supervisory powers, an argument could be made that the Ninth Circuit went too far
in Lindsey II. But resolving that question would require a deep dive into the
243

668 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:621
Of course, it could be argued instead that the Lindsey II
court was not truly engaged in rulemaking or policymaking at
all, but merely was stating the holdings for the case in front of it
and thus observing what existing federal law would require or
forbid in similar financial fraud cases. To accept this view, we
would need to believe that the particular evidentiary rules established by the Ninth Circuit in Lindsey II are compelled by
applicable precedents, statutory language and the Federal Rules
of Evidence. In other words, we would have to accept that these
prophylactic evidentiary rules are mandated by existing law, not
just within the exercise of the court’s discretion. If we accept this
view, then other courts of appeals that do not arrive at the same
conclusion and do not implement such rules would be committing legal error. This seems like a dubious proposition given that
nothing in either the federal wire fraud statute or Supreme
Court precedents mandated such expansive bright-line evidentiary rules.249 It seems more likely that the Ninth Circuit was
exercising some form of discretion to establish these rules.
C. Alternative Evidentiary Approaches
Thus far, no other federal appellate court has adopted
Lindsey II’s prophylactic materiality evidence rules. In Raza, the
Fourth Circuit specifically declined to follow the Ninth Circuit’s
lead, stating:
The Ninth Circuit appears to have barred the evidentiary use
of a lender’s past lending practices on the materiality issue.
In explaining that step, it related that “lending standards applied by an individual lender are poor evidence of a false
statement’s intrinsic ability to affect decision making” .... Although we need not go so far, we understand the rationale for
the Lindsey court’s wholesale rejection of such evidence.250

Given the ultimate outcome in Raza, one can see why the
Fourth Circuit may not have felt compelled to go down Lindsey
federal appellate courts’ supervisory powers in matters covered by the Federal
Rules of Evidence—a matter that is far beyond this Article’s scope.
249 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (wire fraud).
250 See United States v. Raza, 876 F.3d 604, 621 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting
Lindsey II, 850 F.3d at 1018).
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II’s path. After all, as noted above, the jury in Raza was presented
with evidence of uninspiring if not outright reckless lender behavior, as well as information about the lender’s potentially perilous originate-to-distribute mortgage lending model.251 Despite
this evidence, the jury still convicted all four defendants in Raza
for their respective roles in the mortgage fraud scheme.252 Hence,
the Fourth Circuit may not have seen any urgent need for prophylactic evidentiary rules, given the ease with which materiality
can be established in many mortgage fraud cases, and the apparent absence of juror confusion in the Raza case itself.253
Even without adopting Lindsey II’s prophylactic materiality
rules, other courts have accepted the Ninth Circuit’s assertion in
Lindsey II that “the lending standards applied by an individual
lender are poor evidence of a false statement’s intrinsic ability to
affect decision making.”254 The Seventh Circuit’s opinion in BettsGaston illustrates this point.255 The defendant Betts-Gaston argued
that mortgage applications at issue “were not materially false
because the lenders did not care about the information the applications requested, such as the borrower’s income.”256 The district
court excluded Betts-Gaston’s evidence including expert testimony
“that the lenders’ business model depended on generating large
volumes of mortgage loans without regard for the borrower’s
ability to pay.”257 The court concluded that such testimony would be
irrelevant and confusing to the jury.258 Moreover, the district court
sustained the government’s objections to proposed defense crossexamination “on whether the lenders cared about or tried to
verify loan application claims.”259 The Seventh Circuit found no
error, explaining:
Betts-Gaston argues that those rulings were errors because the
expert’s testimony and the cross-examination questions were relevant to the materiality of the loan applications’ false statements.
See supra text accompanying notes 209–29.
Raza, 876 F.3d at 606.
253 Id. at 624.
254 Lindsey II, 850 F.3d at 1018.
255 United States v. Betts-Gaston, 860 F.3d 525, 532 (7th Cir. 2017).
256 Id.
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 Id.
251
252
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We disagree. Betts-Gaston wanted to convince the jury that the
lenders involved here routinely behaved unreasonably—that,
as a matter of policy, they ignored information that a reasonable
lender would consider, like the borrower’s income .... But whether
a statement is material depends on its effect on “a reasonable
person”—or, in this case, a reasonable lender .... Whether a particular lender or group of lenders was in fact reasonable is irrelevant to that question.260

Thus, even though the Seventh Circuit has not adopted
Lindsey II’s evidentiary rules, it did accept one motivating rationale underlying these rules: that how a target financial institution actually responded to misstatements is not probative as
to how a reasonable decision-maker would have responded to
such falsehoods.261 The factual assumption underlying Lindsey
II and Betts-Gaston could, of course, be challenged in a particular
case. One could imagine a defendant arguing that a particular
bank’s employees are eminently reasonable agents of a prudent
financial institution. If so, their lending practices might be representative of industry norms (or the norms of a significant sector
of the industry) and understanding the specific bank’s approach
to lending decisions might be useful to a jury.262 Nevertheless,
under Lindsey II, the proffer of such evidence by the defendant
is forbidden,263 and under Betts-Gaston and Raza, the exclusion
of such evidence almost certainly would not be an abuse of the
trial judge’s discretion.264
D. A Gate that Swings One Way?
A recent federal district court case illustrates an additional
challenge that defendants face under Lindsey II’s evidentiary
Id.
Id. at 522–23.
262 Prior to Lindsey II, a federal district court in California noted in an unpublished decision: “Whether, and to what extent, a jury must know about the
lenders’ decision-making process in a mortgage fraud prosecution would appear
to be an issue over which reasonable minds might disagree.” United States v.
Kuzmenko, No. 2:11-CR-0210 JAM, 2014 WL 7140640, at *6 n.5 (E.D. Cal.
Dec. 12, 2014) (collecting cases).
263 Lindsey II, 850 F.3d 1009, 1011 (9th Cir. 2017).
264 Betts-Gaston, 860 F.3d at 532–33; Raza, 876 F.3d 604, 614, 625 (4th
Cir. 2017).
260
261
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regime. In United States v. Casher, the defendant, an employee
of Rocky Mountain Bank (RMB), argued that the government
should not have been permitted to introduce evidence of RMB’s
“lending practices and whether RMB relied on the alleged misrepresentations.”265 Casher argued that “RMB’s behavior—the
behavior of an individual bank—is inadmissible because whether
or not RMB did or did not rely on the alleged misrepresentations
is not an element of bank fraud or relevant to the materiality
inquiry.”266 In other words, the defendant claimed that the ruling
in Lindsey II is “a gate that swings both ways,”267 barring both
the defendant and the government from introducing evidence
related to a specific lender’s practices.
The district court rejected this argument.268 First, the district court explained that the government “must establish that the
allegedly false statements were, in fact, false,” which requires
providing the jury with necessary context related to the bank’s
loan consideration process.269 Furthermore, the defendant, Casher,
was a loan officer and market president for RMB who approved
the loans at issue in the case,270 so evidence of his role was “relevant to the Government’s case at a fundamental level.”271
Second, the district court explained that although Lindsey
II “limits a defendant from admitting evidence of lender behavior to avoid confusing the jury into believing actual reliance on a
defendant’s false statements is an element of fraud,”272 on the
other hand, “[t]he Government … is free to introduce this evidence when it attempts to demonstrate that the defendant’s
statements were false and material.”273 In fact, the court noted
United States v. Casher, No. CR 19-65-BLG-SPW, 2020 WL 2557849,
at *1–2 (D. Mont. May 20, 2020).
266 Id. at *2.
267 Id.
268 Id.
269 Id. at *2.
270 According to the superseding indictment, the defendant, Casher, made
private loans to Larry Price, “while simultaneously approving loans, in Casher’s
capacity as a loan officer and market president of RMB, to entities controlled
by Price and for which Price was a guarantor—all without disclosing the private
loans to RMB.” Id. at *1.
271 Id. at *2.
272 Id.
273 Id.
265
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that Casher had been “unable to provide any cases where a court
prevented the Government from admitting evidence of a victim
bank’s loan process regarding the loans at issue or of actual reliance on a defendant’s misrepresentations.”274 The district court’s
reasoning boiled down to one key conclusion: “[E]vidence of nonreliance is highly prejudicial to the Government, but evidence of
reliance is not highly prejudicial to the defense.”275 Why is this
the case? Why does Lindsey II’s evidentiary gate only swing one
way? The district court explained:
If a defendant submits evidence of negligent reliance or evidence
of other bad loan practices, the evidence is highly prejudicial and
misleading because it implies the Government must prove an
additional element: actual reliance. The Court would most likely
find the probative value of the lender’s past behavior (if any
probative value existed) was substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, and misleading the jury.276

According to Casher, the same conclusion does follow, however, if it is the government, and not the defendant, who seeks to
introduce such reliance evidence:
On the other hand, if the Government introduces evidence of
actual reliance, the evidence is not highly prejudicial to the
defendant because it does not, for example, reduce the number of
elements the Government must prove. Rather, actual reliance
can be highly probative of whether the allegedly false statements
were material. The jury is then left to decide whether the victim
bank’s subjective reliance on the false statements indicates the
false statements were objectively material. If necessary, the Court
could accept a limiting instruction explaining as much.277

The emphasized part of the quote above is essential. According the district court in Casher, evidence of actual reliance
tends to prove materiality, but even if evidence of non-reliance
could tend to prove immateriality such evidence is highly prejudicial and misleading.278 Thus, in the case at hand, the district
Id.
Id. at *3.
276 Id.
277 Id. (emphasis added).
278 Id.
274
275
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court ruled that the government “might elicit testimony from RMB
employees about the importance of the information contained in the
loan documents,”279 and “may also elicit testimony that RMB did
rely on the false statements and likely would not have approved
the loans at issue had it known of the misrepresentations.”280
The district court did make two concessions to Casher.281
First, the court acknowledged that if the government opens the
door by soliciting testimony regarding the bank’s actual reliance
on the alleged misrepresentations to establish materiality, “the
defendant may cross-examine and submit evidence of his own to
cast doubt on whether the lenders did rely on the false statements
and whether the information was capable of influencing their
decision-making.”282 The court cautioned: “However, the defendant
could only submit contrasting evidence for this limited purpose (e.g.,
he could not then submit evidence of other bad loans that the bank
approved).”283 Second, the district court pointed out that under
Lindsey II, the defendant “is free to rebut the Government’s evidence by testimony of industry practices.”284 Thus, “Casher may
attempt to show RMB acted unreasonably and that a reasonable
bank would not have relied on the defendant’s false statements—
i.e., the misrepresentations were immaterial. Again, the jury would
be left to decide, when comparing both parties’ evidence, whether
the false statements were material.”285
Casher thus illustrates an advantage that the government
possesses in criminal fraud cases under Lindsey II: the government may introduce evidence regarding a financial institution’s
actual reliance to prove materiality, while the defendant may
not touch on a bank’s lack of reliance (except to rebut the government’s reliance evidence).286 Defendants must steer clear of
Id. at *2.
Id. (citing United States v. Ovist, 2012 WL 5830296, at *7 (D. Or. Nov. 16,
2012)) (“[T]o decide whether the false statements had a natural tendency to
influence, or were capable of influencing, the decisions of the lenders, the jury
must know something about the lenders’ decision-making process.”).
281 See infra notes 282–85 and accompanying text.
282 Casher, No. CR 19-65-BLG-SPW, 2020 WL 2557849, at *2 n.1.
283 Id.
284 Id. at *3 (citing Lindsey II, 850 F.3d 1009, 1016 (9th Cir. 2017)).
285 Id.
286 See Lindsey II, 850 F.3d at 1017.
279
280
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evidence regarding the target financial institution’s lack of actual
reliance and, instead, focus on proof that a hypothetical reasonable
lender would not have been sufficiently influenced—to whatever
extent demanded by the law—by the defendant’s misrepresentations. As sensible as this might seem, it may not be easy for fraud
defendants to explore the question of what a hypothetical financial
institution might do without either entering forbidden reliance
territory or, even worse, suggesting that the victim was somehow
at fault for the defendant’s fraud, which is also problematic. The
next and final part of this Article explores these complications.
V.OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE MATERIALITY RECONSIDERED
A. Two Materiality Paths?
Throughout this Article, we have explored an issue that has
concerned courts and lawyers since Neder was decided more
than 20 years ago: whether an objective or subjective materiality
test applies in mail, wire, and bank fraud cases involving financial institutions. The two case studies in this Article, Lindsey II
and Raza, suggest that the answer to the question is simple:
materiality in federal criminal fraud cases is judged under an
objective standard.287 To paraphrase Raza, materiality requires
that we focus on reasonable lenders and not renegade banks.288
Unfortunately, this answer may be misleading insofar as it suggests that there is only one way to prove materiality.289 It is true
See supra notes 232–33 and accompanying text.
See United States v. Raza, 876 F.3d at 621 (4th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he correct
test for materiality ... is an objective one, which measures a misrepresentation’s
capacity to influence an objective ‘reasonable lender,’ not a renegade lender
with a demonstrated habit of disregarding materially false information.”).
289 Thus far, criminal fraud defendants have been unsuccessful in their efforts to get the Supreme Court to wade in further on this issue, despite their
claims that a circuit split exists on materiality standards. See Raza Cert. Petition,
supra note 192; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, United States v. Betts-Gaston,
860 F.3d 525 (7th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 689 (2018) (No. 17-705),
available on Westlaw at 2017 WL 5433144. For example, Raza’s unsuccessful
petition for a writ of certiorari argued:
The circuits are intractably divided over the standard for proving materiality in federal fraud prosecutions involving a private,
as opposed to a government, victim. For private victims, some
287
288
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that the government can establish a criminal fraud case with
objective materiality evidence based upon a reasonable lender.290
Numerous federal appellate court cases, including Lindsey II and
Raza, make this clear.291 For example, if mortgage loan applicants
accused of fraud lied about their family income and provided
falsified tax documents in support of their false income claims,
the government would introduce evidence that prudent lenders
care very much about a borrower’s income to establish the required element of materiality. The earlier discussion of Raza
provided a myriad of examples of income, employment and savings misrepresentations in the context of mortgage fraud.292
circuits have held that a misrepresentation is material only if it
could influence the decision of the actual decisionmaker to which
the misrepresentation was addressed. Other circuits, by contrast,
have held that a misrepresentation is material as long as it
could influence the decision of a hypothetical “reasonable person.”
Raza Cert. Petition, supra note 192, at 2 (asserting that “the circuits are
deeply divided on a fundamental question: the standard for determining the
materiality of a misrepresentation made to a private victim”); Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, Shin v. United States, No. CR 04-00150 SOM, 2017 WL
2802866 (D. Haw. June 28, 2017), aff’d, 782 F. App’x. 595 (9th Cir. 2019),
cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1123 (2020) (No.19-848), available online at 2020 WL
93924 (“The Circuits disagree over the standard for proof of materiality in
federal fraud prosecutions and disagree as to whether the ‘demanding’ materiality requirement that necessitated clarification in [Escobar] altered how
rigorously that standard must be imposed.”) (case involving False Statements
prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(3)).
In contrast, the United States Solicitor General’s Office has taken the
view that no true circuit split exists on the materiality standards in criminal
fraud cases. Brief for the United States in Opposition, United States v. Raza,
876 F.3d 604 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2679 (2018) (No. 17-1314),
available online at 2018 WL 2299235, at 16–17 (collecting cases). Instead, the
U.S. Government has asserted that “every court of appeals has stated that a
false statement or omission is material if it is capable of influencing a reasonable
decisionmaker.” Id. at 17; see also id. at 18–19 (“Petitioners cite no court of
appeals decision holding that a misstatement or omission cannot be material
if it is capable of influencing a reasonable decisionmaker, but not the intended
victim.”); id. at 20 (asserting that no cases “turned on the difference between
the fraud’s effect on the intended victim, as opposed to its effect on a reasonable decisionmaker”).
290 Raza, 876 F.3d at 621.
291 See id.; see also Lindsey II, 850 F.3d 1009, 1014 (9th Cir. 2017).
292 See supra text accompanying notes 194–96 (discussing Raza, 876 F.3d
at 609–11).
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Furthermore, if the government establishes its case with
objective materiality evidence, to disprove materiality, the defendants could argue that a hypothetical reasonable lender would not
have cared enough about the misrepresentations, thus rendering
them immaterial. Obviously, that would be difficult to prove with
respect to misstated job titles, income, and assets. On the other
hand, it might be possible to establish a lack of materiality if the
particular information requested by the lender typically is unimportant in lending decisions according to accepted industry norms.
In Lindsey II, Judge Gould provided the following example:
To illustrate, suppose a defendant is charged with wire fraud
for falsely stating on a loan application that he was married. In
such a case, it would be admissible for a defense expert to testify
that, while mortgage applications usually ask about marital status, the general practice in the industry is to ignore marital
status when making lending decisions. The defendant could then
argue in closing that his false statement about marriage was
immaterial, and so the elements of wire fraud have not been
proven. By contrast, a district court could properly exclude evidence that (a) the particular lender to whom the defendant
lied did not generally give weight to marital status when deciding whether to lend, or (b) there were prior instances in which
that lender did not consider marital status in making loans.293

Nevertheless, the fact that the government may (and typically will) establish its case with objective materiality evidence
does not necessarily mean that the government is precluded from
establishing a criminal fraud case with subjective materiality
evidence instead.294 Thus, we can see why the plain answer above
gleaned from Lindsey II and Raza—that materiality is judged
according to an objective test—may be misleading. As the Eleventh
Circuit observed in Svete: “The objective reliability of a misrepresentation is sufficient to establish its materiality, but proof of
Lindsey II, 850 F.3d at 1016.
The Eleventh Circuit asserted that “[a]ll the sources cited by the Supreme
Court” in Neder “support the proposition that materiality may be proved without
establishing that the misrepresentation was objectively reliable.” United States
v. Svete, 556 F.3d 1157, 1164 (11th Cir. 2009) (en banc); see also Couture, supra
note 58, at 8 (noting that “[b]oth definitions of materiality cited in Neder include
within their reach statements that an objectively reasonable person would not
regard as important”).
293
294
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objective reliability is not necessary to establish materiality if
the defendant knows or should know that the victim is likely to
regard the misrepresented facts as important.”295 Thus, under
Svete, materiality can be established with either proof that a reasonable person would have been sufficiently influenced by the
defendant’s misrepresentations (objective materiality evidence)
or proof that the defendant knew that the specific target or intended recipient was likely to be influenced by the defendant’s
misrepresentations, regardless of whether a reasonable person
would have been so influenced (subjective materiality evidence).296
There are two alternative materiality paths.297
In practice, however, one can assume it will be relatively rare
for a federal criminal fraud case involving a financial institution
Svete, 556 F.3d at 1165.
Several authors have advocated in favor of a subjective materiality standard
in federal fraud cases. See Couture, supra note 58, at 7 (asserting that “[i]n the
wire and mail fraud context ... materiality is a subjective standard”); Lunsford,
supra note 84, at 386 (“Based on the text, history, and current interpretations
of the mail and wire fraud statutes, it is both the intent of Congress and the
interpretation of the Supreme Court that the objective standard for materiality
has no place in the federal statutory scheme for fraud crimes.”). A fair reading
suggests that the argument being advanced in such scholarly works is that
an objective materiality should not be applied to the exclusion of subjective
materiality—not that subjective materiality alone should be the only path to
proving fraud. This is the approach of the Eleventh Circuit in Svete, 556 F.3d
at 1164–65.
297 Recall the Restatement (Second) of Torts alternative definitions of materiality and the Gaudin/Kungys materiality definition. See supra Section
I.C.1. The first prong of the Restatement test embodies objective materiality:
a matter is material if “a reasonable man would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence in determining his choice of action in the transaction
in question.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538(2)(a) (AM. L. INST. 1977).
The second prong of the Restatement materiality definition embodies subjective materiality: a matter is material if “the maker of the representation
knows or has reason to know that its recipient regards or is likely to regard
the matter as important in determining his choice of action, although a reasonable man would not so regard it.” Id. § 538(2)(b). As discussed earlier, there is
debate as to whether Neder intended that the Restatement (Second) of Torts
materiality standards would apply in federal criminal fraud cases. See supra
notes 88–92 and accompanying text. The two prongs of the Restatement’s materiality standard are being used here for illustration only. The Gaudin/Kungys
materiality definition similarly includes a subjective component. See Couture,
supra note 39, at 80 (explaining that both materiality standards in Neder
include a subjective component).
295
296
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to be predicated upon purely subjective materiality evidence. In
civil contract and torts cases involving individuals there may be
occasions where a fraudster preys on a person’s known idiosyncrasies,298 thus satisfying subjective materiality but not the objective materiality test. Charlie Brown might want to buy a used
car once owned by his childhood baseball hero, Joe Shlabotnik,299
even if this fact of prior ownership would be of little interest to most
reasonable auto consumers. Charlie Brown’s preference (if known)
could be exploited by a sleazy used car salesperson. It seems less
likely, however, that a bank or other financial institution would
have idiosyncratic preferences, much less that a borrower would
be aware of these unique preferences and then lie to a bank to
exploit them. It is not impossible, of course, just not very likely.
Thus, while theoretically, the government can establish materiality with either objective or subjective materiality evidence in mail,
wire and bank fraud cases, the use of objective materiality evidence is more likely in cases involving financial institutions.300
B. Gullible Banks
Alleged fraudsters may wish to argue that a financial institution or its staff was incompetent, unreasonable, or even complicit
in the fraud scheme.301 Putting aside the law, we can see why a
See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text.
See Peanuts Wiki: Joe Shlabotnik, FANDOM, https://peanuts.fandom.com
/wiki/Joe_Shlabotnik [https://perma.cc/E5U6-7XDR].
300 There are some unusual cases that might appear difficult to characterize on the objective/subjective divide. In one “rather unusual bank fraud case,”
United States v. Rigas, 490 F.3d 208, 234 (2d Cir. 2007), the Second Circuit
explained: “If a bank’s discretion is limited by an agreement, we must look to
the agreement to determine what factors are relevant, and when a misstatement becomes material.” Id. at 235. This evidence might seem “subjective” in
a sense in that the court is considering what the particular bank involved in
the case might have done under the circumstances. Id. But this materiality
evidence can also be viewed as “objective,” as the court is considering what a
reasonable decision-maker, cabined by the applicable contractual agreements
would have done under the circumstances. Id. (explaining that “[t]he only
‘decisions’ that the bank could make, in the case the government presented to
the jury, involved how much interest would be charged—an objective decision
cabined by the ranges set in the Co-Borrowing Agreements”).
301 It must also be pointed out that the victim under federal fraud statutes
is the financial institution itself, not its duplicitous or incompetent staff. See
298
299
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criminal defense attorney would like the jury to hear about a
lender’s culpability. Whether phrased in terms of a defendant’s
lack of fraudulent intent or an absence of materiality in the defendant’s misstatements, blaming the lender is likely to be a losing
argument.302 Numerous federal appellate court opinions have held
that it is no defense to criminal fraud that the victims were negligent or gullible.303 According to the Fourth Circuit, this principle
applies with equal force to banks and other financial institutions:
The susceptibility of the victim of the fraud, in this case a financial institution, is irrelevant to the analysis: “If a scheme to
defraud has been or is intended to be devised, it makes no difference whether the persons the schemers intended to defraud are
Scott Mah et al., Financial Institutions Fraud, 57 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 787, 800
(2020) (“[K]nowledge of the scheme or even participation in the scheme by the
defrauded bank’s officers adds no support to a ‘good faith’ defense because it is
the financial institution itself, and not one of its officers, that is being defrauded.”)
(citing United States v. Hamaker, 455 F.3d 1316, 1325 (11th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Rackley, 986 F.2d 1357, 1361 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Saks,
964 F.2d 1514, 1518–19 (5th Cir. 1992)); see also United States v. Jimenez, 513
F.3d 62, 74 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Waldroop, 431 F.3d 736,
742 (10th Cir. 2005)) (explaining that the financial institution, not its officers
or agents, is the victim of a bank fraud scheme).
302 See United States v. Gaver, No. 19-4026, 2020 WL 2770600, at *2 (4th
Cir. May 28, 2020) (concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding “certain evidence relating to the victims’ alleged negligence,
complicity, or actual knowledge of [the defendant’s] fraudulent scheme”).
303 United States v. Svete, 556 F.3d 1157, 1165 (11th Cir. 2009) (en banc)
(stating that “a defendant who intends to deceive the ignorant or gullible by
preying on their infirmities is no less guilty” of mail fraud); United States v.
Weaver, 860 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[T]he unreasonableness of a fraud
victim in relying (or not) on a misrepresentation does not bear on a defendant’s
criminal intent in designing the fraudulent scheme, whereas the materiality
of the false statement does.”). As the Second Circuit explains:
The “unreasonable victim” argument misapprehends the function
of the ordinary prudence standard. To establish a violation of
the federal fraud statutes, the government must prove a scheme
to defraud. Critical to this showing is evidence that the defendant
“possessed a fraudulent intent.” The role of the ordinary prudence
and comprehension standard is to assure that the defendant’s
conduct was calculated to deceive, not to grant permission to
take advantage of the stupid or careless.
United States v. Thomas, 377 F.3d 232, 242 (2d Cir. 2004) (footnote and citations omitted).
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gullible or skeptical, dull or bright. These are criminal statutes,
not tort concepts.”304

Still, it must be acknowledged that there are some authorities—a minority view to be sure—that suggest that a criminal
fraud conviction requires proof that that reasonable person would
have been fooled by the defendant’s scheme.305 For example, the
Sixth Circuit has asserted that “[a] fraudulent scheme must include
a material misrepresentation, which is a misrepresentation that
could influence the decision of a ‘person[ ] of ordinary prudence and
comprehension.’”306 The Tenth Circuit has made similar claims.307
Despite such statements of law, it is hard to find appellate court
decisions that have overturned federal fraud convictions because
a fraud scheme that succeeded against a gullible target would
not have fooled a reasonably prudent person.308 The trend in the
law is clear:
United States v. Colton, 231 F.3d 890, 903 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting United
States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299, 311 (1st Cir. 1980)). As Judge Posner once wrote
for the Seventh Circuit: “It would be very odd for the law to protect only those
who, being able to protect themselves, do not need the law’s protection. In fact
picking on the vulnerable normally makes your conduct more rather than less
culpable, earning you a heavier sentence.” United States v. Coffman, 94 F.3d
330, 334 (7th Cir.1996).
305 In Svete, Chief Judge Edmonson argued that the common law of fraud
and the federal mail fraud statute require “the government ordinarily to
show that the pertinent scheme or misrepresentation was capable of inducing
reliance on the part of a reasonable person exercising ordinary prudence for
the protection of his own interests.” Svete, 556 F.3d at 1170 (Edmondson,
C.J., concurring in the result) (footnote omitted).
306 United States v. Petlechkov, 922 F.3d 762, 766 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting
United States v. Jamieson, 427 F.3d 394, 415–16 (6th Cir. 2005)); Jamieson,
427 F.3d at 415 (“It is well-established in this circuit that a scheme to defraud, as
prohibited by the mail fraud statute, ‘must involve misrepresentations or
omissions reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence and
comprehension.’” (quoting Berent v. Kemper Corp., 973 F.2d 1291, 1294 (6th
Cir. 1992) (quoting Walters v. First Tennessee Bank, 855 F.2d 267, 273 (6th
Cir. 1988)))).
307 United States v. Fredette, 315 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir. 2003) (stating
that “in order to prove a scheme to defraud, ‘the government must show conduct intended or reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence
or comprehension’” (quoting United States v. Janusz, 135 F.3d 1319, 1323
(10th Cir. 1998))).
308 In Svete, the Eleventh Circuit overruled what may have been one such
rare case, United States v. Brown, 79 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir.1996). See Svete,
304
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A few circuits have, without connecting their pronouncements
to the materiality standard, stated that a fraudulent scheme must
be credible enough to influence a reasonable person in order to
be actionable as wire or mail fraud. The trend, however, is away
from this minority rule and toward using the credibility of the
scheme merely as an indicator of whether the defendant possessed the requisite intent to defraud.309

What if a defendant instead argues that any reasonable
financial institution would be too savvy or sophisticated to be
fooled by a particular scheme? In one interesting case, bank fraud
defendants argued that proof of materiality was not satisfied
because the $15 million cashier’s check involved in the case “was
so obviously fraudulent that no bank official could have been
influenced to take any action in reliance on it.”310 In essence, the
fraudsters were not saying that the victim was too gullible for their
actions to count as fraud, rather they were arguing that their
scheme was too dumb to count as criminal fraud.311 The Eighth
Circuit rejected that argument, once again distinguishing materiality from reliance:
Here, the nature of the item itself was evidence of materiality.
The evidence showed that defendants presented bank employees
with a fraudulent Bank of America cashier’s check and made false
statements about the check in order to influence the bank to
negotiate it. The fact that the cashier’s check was obviously fraudulent (apparently the check was the wrong size and printed
on the wrong type of paper, the check was made out to bearer
556 F.3d at 1168 (“According to one treatise, Brown ‘is the only major criminal
case where the court absolved the defendants by finding unreasonable reliance by
the alleged victim of fraud.’” (citing 1 JOEL ANDROPHY, WHITE COLLAR CRIME
§ 8:2.70 (2d ed. 2006))).
309 Couture, supra note 58, at 8–9 (footnotes omitted); see also Wang, supra
note 83, at 277–78 (stating that “some circuits may endorse the ‘reasonable
person’ or ‘person of ordinary prudence’ definition: mail/wire fraud is material
only if a ‘reasonable person’ would attach importance to the misstatement or
nondisclosure,” whereas “[o]ther circuits have abandoned the ‘reasonable person’
standard of materiality in favor of the broader formulation: capable of influencing the intended victim”).
310 United States v. Rashid, 383 F.3d 769, 778 (8th Cir. 2004), cert. granted,
judgment vacated on other grounds sub nom. Abu Nahia v. United States, 546
U.S. 803 (2005).
311 See Rashid, 383 F.3d at 772–73. The unsuccessful fraud scheme was
discovered quite easily by bank personnel. See id.
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only, the bank logo was wrong, and the perforation was in the
wrong place) does not mean that it was not material, that is, that
it did not have a natural tendency to influence the bank or was
not capable of influencing the bank. The fact that the bank was
not actually influenced or actually deceived does not mean that
the check and defendants’ false statements about the check were
not material.312

The outcome in Rashid seems tough to dispute given the
defendant’s obvious fraudulent intent and the undisputed falsity
of the $15 million check.313 But there is something curious in the
Eighth Circuit’s materiality reasoning. Rashid implies that an
“obviously fraudulent” check could have the natural tendency to
influence or could be capable of influencing a bank.314 There is
no explanation, however, as to why this is the case. If someone
tries to deposit a suitcase full of Monopoly™ money at a bank
and informs the teller that it is legal currency, would that be a
material misrepresentation? Under Rashid, the falsehood could
be material, though there seems to be something odd about that
outcome given that no reasonable bank would or could be fooled
in such a manner.315 How does a suitcase full of Monopoly™
money differ from a crudely created cashier’s check for $15 million? The distinction is unclear. Perhaps the simple answer is
that the Monopoly™ money scam could indeed land someone in
federal prison, as absurd as that seems.
C. Endemic Irrationality
The foregoing discussion leads to the ultimate materiality
conundrum. What if an entire industry is, in some sense, unreasonable? This is essentially what scholars have argued about a vast
part of the mortgage lending industry in the years preceding the
Id. at 778–79.
See id. at 772.
314 The Eighth Circuit did not actually say this—what the court stated was
that “[t]he fact that the cashier’s check was obviously fraudulent ... does not mean
that it was not material, that is, that it did not have a natural tendency to influence the bank or was not capable of influencing the bank.” Id. at 778–79. It would
have been more direct for the Rashid court to have stated that the obviously
fake cashier’s check in the case was material, though the Court of Appeals chose
not to do so.
315 Nor does this seem to be a case of exploiting the gullible, as just discussed.
312
313
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Great Recession.316 When few lenders are sleazy or incompetent
renegades and the vast majority of financial institutions are prudent, the application of an objective materiality standard seems
sensible and easy to administer. What if, instead, a lack of due
diligence is endemic? What if innumerable lenders continually
and regularly act in a foolish, suboptimal or otherwise improper
manner? The role of materiality as a required element of criminal fraud is unclear if such behavior becomes the norm. In an
effort to adhere to an “objective” materiality standard, courts may
end up holding criminal defendants to a normative materiality standard based on what should theoretically affect relevant bank
decision-makers, even though we as a society know that financial
institutions may be disregarding these principles systematically.317
If the purpose of requiring proof of materiality is connected somehow to establishing the defendant’s mens rea or fraudulent intent,318 applying a fictional materiality standard unconnected to
actual bank behavior might be an undesirable outcome.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has made it clear that proof of materiality is required for convictions under the federal mail, wire
and bank fraud statutes.319 During the past twenty years, the
federal courts have endeavored to apply materiality to federal
fraud cases involving financial institutions.320 This task is easier
said than done. Transplanting an elusive common law concept to
the federal criminal law context has proven quite challenging.321
See generally KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME
VIRUS: RECKLESS CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS (2011);
Edwards, supra note 9, at 60–68 (discussing the rise of non-prime lending, a
decline in home loan underwriting standards, and increased securitization of
mortgage debt prior to the Great Recession).
317 David Kwok raises a similar point in his discussion of normative and
descriptive conceptions of materiality in the False Claims Act context. See Kwok,
supra note 80, at 532 (explaining that “courts may conflate the normative and
descriptive approaches to causation, as it is unclear whether a juror should
apply her judgment as to what lies should influence the government as opposed
to which lies actually influence the government”).
318 See supra note 82; supra text accompanying note 83.
319 See supra Section I.C.
320 See supra Section I.C.2.
321 See supra Section I.C.2.
316

684 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:621
The Supreme Court’s decision in Escobar provided the federal appellate courts with an opportunity to reconsider the role of materiality in criminal fraud cases.322 Thus far, the federal appellate
courts have rejected the application of Escobar’s “subjective”
materiality standard to the criminal fraud context.323 Instead,
the courts of appeals have endorsed an objective materiality
standard tethered to what a reasonable lender would do—not
the behavior of renegade lenders.324
Although limiting Escobar to the False Claims Act context
may be correct,325 the manner in which courts have interpreted and
applied Escobar shows deep judicial skepticism towards criminal
defendants who try to challenge the government’s materiality
evidence.326 Courts must remember, however, that materiality is
a required element for the government to establish beyond a
reasonable doubt—immateriality is not an affirmative defense
that criminal defendants must prove.327 Materiality may not be
hard to prove—especially in mortgage fraud cases—but it is still
the government’s burden to do so.328 Furthermore, if an entire
industry’s decision-making processes become deeply flawed, as it
did prior to the Great Recession, we must ask what it means for
false statements to be material and, ultimately, what role materiality plays in our conception of criminal fraud.329

See supra Part II.
See supra Part III.
324 See supra Part IV.
325 As the Escobar Court explained, “The False Claims Act is not ‘an allpurpose antifraud statute.’” Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel.
Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2003 (2016) (quoting Allison Engine Co. v. United
States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 672 (2008)). This is in stark contrast to the
mail, wire and bank fraud statutes, which are designed as capacious, broadreaching anti-fraud laws.
326 See supra Part III.
327 See supra Part IV.
328 See supra Part V.
329 See supra Section V.C.
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